Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [35]
Tension had arisen between USDI and the heads of NSA and NGA, both of whom also had a responsibility to the DCI and now have one to the DNI. Although they head combat support agencies and although their budgets still come through DOD channels, the heads of these agencies struggle with their two masters within the executive branch—DOD and the DNI. During the congressional hearings about the 2004 intelligence legislation, the directors of NSA and NGA (Hayden and Clapper, respectively) testified that they believed they should come under the new DNI, a view that was not pleasing to DOD officials. However, neither the DNI nor USDI can issue orders or directives to NSA or NGA without taking into account the sensibilities of the other office.
The EXCOM established by DNI McConnell again raised the issue of the relationship between USDI and the defense intelligence agencies, all of whom are members of the EXCOM. To clarify the hierarchy, the USDI has been designated as the director of Defense Intelligence to make it clear that the USDI continues to have a position superior to the agencies even though they all sit on the same committee. Significantly, USDI Clapper has stated that he will carry out his director of Defense Intelligence function under the DNI, signaling a closer working relationship than had existed previously.
Another internal Defense set of relationships that matter are those between the Combatant Commands (CoComs) and the national intelligence agencies. Rivalry most often arises concerning control over collection assets between the regional CoComs (there are also functional CoComs) and national agencies. CoComs, of necessity, are more responsive to crises in their geographic areas of responsibility (AORs), although these may not loom as large when seen from Washington. Thus, CoComs are likely to demand intelligence collection that may not be supported by the national collection agencies or policy makers in Washington.
There has been a change in how DIA functions and in its relationship to the intelligence offices (formerly J-2s) at the CoComs. In April 2006, DIA was also designated as the Defense Joint Intelligence Operations Center (DJIOC, pronounced “dee-jai-ock.”) The JIOC concept derives from the recognition that operations and intelligence work much more closely now than they have in the past and that part of the United States’ military superiority in combat stems directly from superior intelligence support (or “battlefield awareness”). The so-called thunder run of U.S. forces into Baghdad in 2003 typifies this type of operation. To enhance this cooperation, DIA was designated as the DJIOC. with the ultimate goal of integrating intelligence, operations, and plans. In addition, the DJIOC is to coordinate and set priorities for all intelligence requirements across all commands, combat support agencies, reserve components, and service intelligence centers. The J-2s at each command are now also designated as JIOCs and they are supposed to refer back to the DJIOC for intelligence operational and planning support. The closer integration of planning, intelligence, and operations is undoubtedly a good idea; whether it will foster improved relations with the CoComs is less certain.
The USDI AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH CONGRESS. The USDI is one of two main conduits through which defense intelligence issues reach Congress, the other being DIA itself. But given the principle of civilian control of the