Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [34]
Much of the secretary of defense’s authority for intelligence usually devolves to the undersecretary of defense for intelligence, who becomes, in effect, the chief operating officer for defense intelligence. (The USDI is also the third ranking official in DOD, after the secretary and deputy.) DOD traditionally has tended to look at the intelligence community warily, worrying that the community managers might not be looking after DOD needs and that they might be assuming too much power over defense intelligence. The key to this relationship is the credibility of the DNI or his office with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD); that is, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) should have a working knowledge of defense intelligence programs and needs and of the defense budget process. This helps explain why Gen. Mike Hayden was chosen to be the first principal deputy DNI, as he is both a career military officer and a career intelligence officer, most recently the director of NSA. McConnell had a similar background when he became DNI. The DNI and OSD have an unbalanced relationship, with OSD the stronger partner. If officials in OSD have the sense that the DNI is not paying adequate attention to DOD needs and privileges, they can stymie much that the DNI wants to do.
The relationship between DHS and the intelligence community continues to evolve. Critics of the imbalance between defense and intelligence sometimes refer to DOD as “the 800-pound gorilla.” Some observers now recognize that DHS has the potential to be the other 800-pound gorilla. In other words, the sheer size and complexity of DHS are likely to make it an increasingly important intelligence consumer. Therefore, the relationship of the DNI and the director of the NCTC with the secretary of DHS is important.
The relationship between the DNI and Congress has three key components. The first is the power of the purse. Congress not only funds the intelligence community (and the rest of the government) but also can, through its funding decisions, affect intelligence programs. Although it is generally believed that Congress reduces presidential budget requests, it has in many instances championed programs and funded them despite opposition from the executive branch.
The second is personal. Past DCIs have occasionally not gotten along with their overseers, to the ultimate detriment of the DCIs and the intelligence community. William J. Casey (1981-1987) was fairly contemptuous of the oversight process, which cost him support, even among his political allies. James Woolsey ended up in a constant public squabble with the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Dennis DeConcini, D-Ariz. John M. Deutch (1995-1997) had a difficult relationship with the House Intelligence Committee. The question of the rights and wrongs in each of these cases is irrelevant. Simply put, the DNI can only lose in the end. Also, having created the DNI to solve a set of perceived problems, Congress will be watching closely to see if the DNI meets expectations.
The third is the public perception of intelligence and support for it. Because of the secrecy surrounding intelligence, citizens get a glimpse of it mainly through congressional activities. Even without knowing the details of hearings, the fact that a congressional committee is investigating an intelligence issue affects media and public perceptions. After all, if the intelligence community is doing its job, why have a hearing or investigation? And, as is usually the case, bad news tends to get reported more often than good news.
USDI AND THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. USDI was created by Congress in 2002 at the behest of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld (2001-2006),