Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [51]
An added complication in building future technical collection systems is the shrinking industrial base that occurred in the 1990s. Secretary of Defense William Perry (1994-1997) had urged defense contractors to consolidate, arguing that there were too many firms competing for declining defense dollars. A period of consolidation followed, with firms either merging or acquiring one another. In the late 1990s it became apparent that there were now actually very few firms left, especially in such high specialty areas as technical collection systems. Thus, in the case of FIA there were only two industrial teams bidding on the contract.
The intelligence budget is also important because it is a major means by which Congress influences and even controls intelligence activities. Congress tended to be supportive of collection requirements throughout the cold war, but it was also inclined to support the disparity between collection and the less-favored processing and exploitation. Some changes in emphasis began to appear in the mid-1990s. The House Intelligence Committee, for example, advocated the use of some smaller imagery satellites, both to have greater flexibility and to save on building and launching costs. This committee also tried to redress the collection and P&E balance, emphasizing the importance of TPEDs (tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination). However, the TPEDs problem remains and may grow worse as new collection systems are launched, as they will have increased collection capabilities. Indeed, it has become increasingly difficult to get congressional backing for new collection systems without promising to improve the amount of intelligence that is processed and exploited.
LONG LEAD TIMES. All technical collection systems are extremely complex. They have to be able to collect the desired data, perhaps store it, and then send it to a remote location where it can be processed. All systems have to be rugged enough to endure difficult conditions, whether Earth-bound or space-based, although those in space face more austere challenges. No matter how satisfactory current collection capabilities are, there are several impetuses to build new systems: to improve collection capabilities, to take advantage of new technologies, and to respond to changing intelligence priorities.
The technological challenges alone are daunting and are a significant factor in the time required to build and launch a new system. From the point that a decision is made to acquire such new technology to the actual launch can be as long as ten to fifteen years. Reaching the decision to build a new system involves additional time (sometimes several years) as intelligence agencies and their policy customers debate which intelligence needs should take priority, which technologies should be pursued, and what trade-offs should be made among competing systems in an always constrained budget. Getting congressional approval can also take several years, especially if there is disagreement on which systems should have funding priority. DNI Mike McConnell has expressed his frustration with the satellite acquisition system, comparing the U.S. system with that of Europe, where a satellite can be developed in five years and cost less than $1 billion. But McConnell also admits that U.S. satellites are built to collect against a more diverse set of targets and that there is now a higher degree of risk aversion prevalent in the U.S. system. This last point is important. Collection satellites are extremely complex to build, orbit, and manage, and launching them into a proper orbit really is rocket science. It is interesting to contrast the risk-averse atmosphere that DNI McConnell notes with the early history of U.S. intelligence satellites. According to the NRO, there were twelve CORONA satellite launches in 1959-1960 before the first successful recovery and thirteen before the first image taken in space.
The net result of the lead times involved (not even taking into account