Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [54]
Jeremiah reported several findings, including the fact that—given the Indian government’s avowed intention to test, which required no clandestine collection to learn—intel—ligence performance could have been better. But he noted that collection assets that might have picked up indications of the impending test were focused on the Korean demilitarized zone (DMZ), at the request of the commander of U.S. forces in Korea. As an NSA director put it, the Korean DMZ was the only place in the world in the late 1990s where someone else could decide if the United States would go to war. Although the Korean DMZ remains a constant concern, for a brief period in 1998, Indian test activities perhaps should have been accorded a higher priority.
COLLECTION SWARM BALL. A major problem that has occurred in managing collection is the phenomenon known as collection swarm ball. This refers to the tendency of all collectors or collection agencies to collect on an issue that is deemed to be important, whether or not they bring anything useful to the table or can offer an appropriate type of collection. It is called “swarm ball” because it resembles the tactics of small children playing soccer, in which both teams converge on the ball en masse regardless of their assigned positions. Swarm ball has usually involved high-priority issues. For example, if a high-priority issue was the cyber attack capabilities of a hostile state, little value would be gained by imagery, although imagery collection managers might be tempted to contribute to the issue based solely on its priority. The impetus for swarm ball is clear: It allows collectors to show that they are working on high-value issues, regardless of their contribution, which will be important for their continued support in the next round of budget allocations.
The solution to swarm ball is twofold. First, agreement must be reached on which INTs are responsible for collecting on specific issues or priorities. This is not a difficult agreement to reach, although it is time consuming, as the attributes of most issues can be delineated (locations, facilities. people involved, likelihood of communications, types of intelligence that is needed, and so on) and then matched against current or impending collection capabilities. Second, the agreement must be rigorously enforced, and agencies must not be penalized for not collecting against issues not suited to them regardless of the issues’ importance and must be recognized for concentrating on the issues about which they can collect needed intelligence.
PROTECTING SOURCES AND METHODS. The details of collection capabilities—and even the existence of some capabilities—are among the most highly classified secrets of any state. In U.S. parlance, classification is referred to as the protection of sources and methods. It is one of the primary concerns of the entire intelligence community and a task specifically assigned by law to the director of national intelligence.
Several levels of classification are in use, reflecting the sensitivity of the intelligence or intelligence means. (See box, “Why Classify?”) The security classifications are driven by concerns that the disclosure of capabilities will allow those nations that are collection targets to take steps to prevent collection, thus effectively negating the collection systems. However, the levels of classification also impose costs, some of which are financial. The physical costs of security—guards, safes, and special means of transmitting intelligence—are high. Added to these is the expense of security checks for individuals who are to be entrusted with classified information (see chap. 7 for details).
Critics maintain that the classification system is sometimes used inappropriately and even promiscuously, classifying material too highly or, in some cases, classifying material that does not deserve to be classified. Critics are also concerned