Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [55]
Beyond the costs of the classification system and its potential abuse, the need to conceal sources and methods limits the use of intelligence as a policy tool. For example, in the late 1950s Khrushchev broke a nuclear test moratorium and blustered about the Soviet Union’s growing strategic nuclear forces. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, bolstered by the first images of the Soviet strategic forces, knew that the United States enjoyed a strong strategic superiority. But, to protect sources and methods, Eisenhower did not reply to Khrushchev’s false boasts. What might have been the results if the United States had released some imagery to counter the Soviet claims? Would the release have spurred the Soviets to greater weapons-building efforts? Would it have severely undercut Soviet foreign policy? Would it have affected U.S. intelligence capabilities, even though the Soviets already knew their country was being overflown by U-2s and later by satellites? These questions are not answerable, but they provide a good overview on the problem.
More recently, the U.S. intelligence community has grown concerned about protecting intelligence sources and methods during post-cold war military operations that involve cooperation with nations that are not U.S. allies. Even among allies the United States employs gradations of intelligence sharing, having the deepest such relationship with Britain, followed closely by Australia and Canada. Intelligence relations with other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies are close, albeit less so than with the “Commonwealth cousins.” But some operations, such as in Bosnia, have involved military operations with nations that are viewed with lingering suspicion, such as Russia and Ukraine. In these cases the need to protect intelligence sources and methods must be balanced against the need to share intelligence—not only for the sake of the operation but also to ensure that military partners in the operation are not put in a position in which their actions or inactions prove to be dangerous to U.S. troops.
WHY CLASSIFY?
Numerous critics of the U.S. classification system have argued—not incorrectly-that classification is used too freely and sometimes for the sake of denying information to others who have a legitimate need for it.
However, a rationale and some sense are behind the way in which classification is intended to be used. Classification derives from the damage that would be done if the information were revealed. Thus, classifcation related to intelligence collection underscores both the importance of the information and the fragility of its source—something that would be difficult to replace if disclosed.
The most common classification is SECRET (CONFIDENTIAL is rarely used any longer), followed by TOP SECRET. Within TOP SECRET are numerous TOP SECRET/CODEWORD compartments—meaning specific bodies of intelligence based on their sources. Admission to any level of classification or compartment is driven by an individual’s certified need to know that specific type of information.
Each classification level is defined; current definitions are found in Executive Order 13292 of March 25, 2003.
• CONFIDENTIAL: information whose unauthorized disclosure “could be expected to cause damage to the national security ”
• SECRET: information whose unauthorized disclosure “could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security ”
• TOP SECRET: information whose unauthorized disclosure “could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security.”
Higher levels of access are useful bureaucratic levers for those who have them in contrast to those who do not.
Another intelligence sharing issue arose in 2002-2003, in the months before Operation Iraqi Freedom. The United States and Britain said they would provide intelligence on Iraqi WMD to United Nations (UN) inspectors but not necessarily all available intelligence. Some controversy arose after