Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [83]
But many intelligence analysts are frustrated by the emphasis on current intelligence. Having developed expertise in an area and analytical skills, they wish to write longer range analyses that look beyond current demands. However, few policy makers are likely to read papers with longer horizons—not owing to lack of interest but to lack of time and the inability to pull away, even briefly, from pressing matters. Thus, a conflict arises between what the policy makers need to read and what many analysts wish to produce. Current intelligence products also tend to be shorter by their nature and goals, further limiting the ability of analysts to add the depth or context that they deem valuable. An additional concern is that if current intelligence represents the majority of what analysts produce, then a risk arises that they will largely become reporters of that day’s collection instead of true analysts. Building true depth of expertise is difficult on a steady diet of current intelligence.
Some middle ground exists simply because the intelligence community does not make a stark choice between one type of analysis and another on any given day. A range of analysis is produced. But because of the limited number of analysts, managers have to decide where to put their resources, and the fact remains that the current intelligence products predominate in terms of resources and the way policy makers perceive the intelligence community.
The current versus mid-term or long-term intelligence conundrum is not the only way to think about allocation issues, although it is the most common. Instead of thinking about intelligence as a matter of time, think about it as a depth versus breadth issue, or a tactical versus strategic issue. By its nature, most current intelligence tends to emphasize breadth over depth. However, one’s analytical sights can be raised to create intelligence that is current as well as strategic. Intelligence may be current in that it is focused on issues on the agenda right now or in the near future, but it also may attempt to give the policy maker a broader look at the issues involved, for example by providing more context, more interconnection with other issues or possible solutions, and so on. A more strategic current intelligence is not produced often but it can be done without pushing the analysis into areas that policy makers are less likely to find useful.
The problem of current versus long-term intelligence also reflects yet another difference in outlook between policy makers and intelligence officers. Policy makers in the United States think in four-year blocks of time, the length of any presidential administration—which at best can be extended to eight years with reelection. Therefore, policy makers have difficulty thinking in larger blocks of time because of their more limited ability to influence events beyond their tenure. Another problem for long-term analytical products is the inherent “softness” of their judgments as their timeframe increases. Trying to gauge likely conditions or outcomes is always difficult, but as the period being examined gets longer, the judgments become much less reliable. Long-range analysis may be interesting intellectually but it is unlikely to be seen as useful by policy makers. Indeed, it could even have a negative effect on the intelligence community at large if some policy makers question why resources are