Intelligence in Nature - Jeremy Narby [75]
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P. 46: DESCARTES
The quote is from Descartes (1997, orig. 1631, pp. 107, 108â9).
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P. 48: HUME, LOCKE AND SCHOPENHAUER
David Hume wrote in A Treatise of Human Nature (1978, orig. 1739): ââTis from the resemblance of the external actions of animals to those we ourselves perform, that we judge their internal likewise to resemble ours; and the same principle of reasoning, carryâd one step farther, will make us conclude that since our internal actions resemble each other, the causes, from which they are derivâd, must also be resembling. When any hypothesis, therefore, is advancâd to explain a mental operation, which is common to men and beasts, we must apply the same hypothesis to bothâ (pp. 176â77). John Locke wrote in An essay concerning human understanding (1975, orig. 1689): âPerception, I believe, is, in some degree, in all sorts of Animals; though in some, possibly, the Avenues, provided by Nature for the reception of Sensations are so few, and the Perception, they are received with, so obscure and dull, that it comes extremely short of the quickness and variety of Sensations, which is in other Animals: but yet it is sufficient for, and wisely adapted to, the state and condition of that sort of Animals, who are thus made: So that the Wisdom and Goodness of the Maker plainly appears in all the Parts of this stupendous Fabrick, and all the several degrees and ranks of Creatures in itâ (p. 148). He added: âAnd therefore, I think we may suppose, That âtis in this, that the Species of Brutes are discriminate from Man; and âtis that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated, and which at last widens to so vast a distance. For if they have any Ideas at all, and are not bare Machines (as some would have them) we cannot deny them to have some Reason. It seems evident to me, that they do some of them in certain Instances reason, as that they have sense; but it is only in particular Ideas, just as they received them from their Senses. They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of Abstractionâ (p. 160) Arthur Schopenhauer wrote in 1851: âThe life of the plants consists in simple existence: so that their enjoyment of life is a purely and absolutely subjective, torpid contentment. With the animals there enters knowledge: but it is still entirely restricted to what serves their own motivation, and indeed their most immediate motivation. That is why they too find complete contentment in simple existence and why