by virtue of its descent, represents a particular combination. The gene pools of different species may overlap a good deal, especially when they are phylogenetically closeâfor example, human beings and chimpanzees have been found to be about 99 per cent the same, geneticallyâbut they are never precisely congruent. Moreover the composition of the pool for any species is changing all the time, which is simply another way of saying that it evolves. With regard to species other than our own, these facts are well-established and uncontentious. But when it comes to humans, they meet with obdurate resistanceâ (p. 25). Ingold (1988) writes: âI endorse the view that the production of artifacts depends on a capacity for symbolic thought unique to Homo sapiens, a capacity that is based in the faculty of language; and I believe this has enormous implications for human evolution and human history. Amongst other things, it allows for innovation by deliberate invention rather than accidents of blind variation, for the transmission of design by teaching rather than imitative blind learning, hence for the active acquisition of culture rather than the passive absorption of tradition, which in turn is responsible for the cumulative or progressive growth of knowledge which is surely an undeniable and unique feature of the history of humankind. Howeverâand this is no minor qualificationâwe should not be misled by these far-reaching consequences of the symbolic faculty into thinking that it underlies everything that we do. My contention, to the contrary, is that it underlies only a small though highly significant fraction of what we do, whereas for the most part human conduct does not differ all that substantially from the conduct of nonhuman animalsâ (p. 85). Ingold adds: âAre we equipped for thinking as beavers are for building dams, or as spiders for spinning webs? Assuredly, if you are a human being, there is a certain adaptive advantage in being able to think, just as there is in being able to construct dams or webs if you are a beaver or a spider. Yet this specialization, since it permits the construction of design, rather than the construction of objects (dams or webs) according to a given design, has made us the most generalized and adaptable animals on Earth. We can, if we will, beat the beaver or the spider at its own game, turning to our own account solutions to technical problems already perfected elsewhere in nature through the long process of evolutionary adaptation. All in all, though humans differ but little from other animal species, no more than the latter differ from one another, that difference has mighty consequences for the world we inhabit, since it is a world that, to an ever greater extent, we have made for ourselves, and that confronts us as the artificial product of human activityâ (p. 97).
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P. 138: JAPANESE VIEW OF NATURE
See Kawade (1998, p. 285).
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P. 138: DEFINITIONS OF âINTELLIGENCEâ
Cohen (1996) writes: âCreativity and intelligence are the greatest accomplishments of our species. One cannot easily define the qualities that mark out a product of human endeavor as a work of genius. Nonetheless, psychologists have tried to define or quantify the nature of creativity and genius. Just as works of genius are products of their time, so the explanations of creativity and intelligence put forward over the years have reflected prevailing cultural and political concerns and have aroused intense feelings. To this day the study of these higher thought processes continues to be surrounded as much by controversy as mystery. It is probably not very smart to attempt a definition of intelligence. The word has too many meanings and is used to describe too many different types of thinking. The cunning of a detective, the wisdom of a judge and the analytical powers of a scientist are undeniably all forms of intelligence. Moreover, different cultures identify widely divergent mental skills as intelligence: a tribesmanâs proficiency at tracking animals and a philosophers dexterity with abstract concepts are regarded as pinnacles