Intelligence in Nature - Jeremy Narby [97]
of intelligence in their own societiesâ (pp. 165â66). Richardson (2000) writes: âWe are beginning to see that the existing ground does not offer a firm foundation for anyone seeking to answer the question: âWhat is intelligence?â Indeed, it is a complex confusion. Most ordinary people seem to know what intelligence is, but it turns out that they arenât so sure. Most psychologists seem sure about it, but their conviction splinters into disparate fragments when they are asked to define it. IQ testers say they can measure it, but do they know what they are measuring? They say those measured differences reflect genetic differences at least as much as âenvironmentalâ differences, but how valid have their concepts and methods for demonstrating that actually been? Intelligence is said to be a general principle of animal life that was given a huge boost in the course of human evolution, but of what the difference consists, and why we have it, remains uncertain. This uncertainty is reflected in unanswered questions about what our huge brains are forâ¦It is clear that the concept of intelligence usually includes deep social and ideological assumptions (of the way that the social world should be, or is naturally) (pp. 22â23). Fuster (2003) writes: âAmong the five cognitive functions considered in this monograph, intelligence is the most complex and the most difficult to define. The complexity derives from the close relationships between intelligence and all other four functionsâperception, memory, attention, and language. All four contribute to intelligence, though each does it in a different way and to a varying degree, depending on the individual and the circumstances. The difficulty of defining intelligence derives from the almost infinite variety of its manifestations. Here it is defined as the ability to adjust by reasoning to new changes, to solve new problems, and to create valued new forms of action and expression. This definition is broad enough to reach into the biological roots of cognition, as I have tried to do with every other cognitive function. At the same time, it is broad enough to reach up to the heights of human achievementâ (p. 213). Vertosick (2002), while recognizing that âthere is no accepted definition of intelligence and no foolproof way of measuring it,â also writes: âWhen I speak of intelligence, I mean the general ability to store past experiences and to use that acquired knowledge to solve future problems. Iâm not limiting my discussion to human intelligence, which many consider synonymous with intelligence itself. Quite the contrary: I reject the notion that human intelligence is unique in the biological realm. Brains are good at solving a certain class of problems, but they hold no monopoly on problem solving in general. Science now labors under the misguided belief that intelligence is a property found only in hardwired conglomerates like brains and their electronic surrogates, computers. I call this misconception âbrain chauvinism,â and I will refute it by showing how all living thingsâeven those entirely devoid of nervous systemsâcan (and must) use some form of reason to survive. In fact, I believe that intelligence and the living process are one and the same: to live, organisms (or communities of organisms) must absorb information, store it, process it, and develop future strategies based upon it. In other words, to be alive, one must thinkâ (pp. xii, 4).
Â
P. 140: THERMOSTATS AND INTELLIGENCE
Dennett (1998) writes: âA thermostat, McCarthy and I claim, is one of the simplest, most rudimentary, least interesting systems that should be included in the class of believersâthe class of intentional systems, to use my term. Why? Because it has a rudimentary goal or desire (which is set, dictatorially, by the thermostatâs owner, of course), which it acts on appropriately whenever it believes (thanks to a sensor of one sort or another) that its desire is unfulfilled. Of course you donât have to describe a thermostat in these terms. You can describe it in mechanical terms, or even molecular terms. But what