Intelligence in Nature - Jeremy Narby [98]
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P. 141: WE DONâT KNOW HOW MICROORGANISMS PROCESS INFORMATION
The quote in the main text is from Nakagaki (2001a) (p. 767).
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P. 141: COCKROACHES
Rinberg and Davidowitz (2000) write in an article entitled âDo Cockroaches âKnowâ about Fluid Dynamics?â: âAnimals use their senses to extract information from the world around them, so they need to be able to gauge the physical properties of their environment in order to build up an accurate perception of it. For example, a bat needs to âknowâ the velocity of sound to estimate how far away an object is, although input to a sensory system may often exploit more complicated properties than this. Here we measure the response by the wind-sensing system of the American cockroach (Periplaneta Americana) to a complex hydrodynamic flow. We find the insectâs interneurons relay crucial information about the windâs spectral properties, which may warn it of approaching predators. The cockroach senses minute air movements using tiny hairs on two posterior appendages called cerci. It can surmise the direction of an attack and scurry away to avoid being eaten. Neural signals from the hairs converge on the terminal abdominal ganglion where the wind information is processed, and are then conveyed further by giant interneurons. Although this system has many of the properties of more complex systems, it remains simple enough to be tractable for studyâ (p. 756).
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P. 142: JUST BEING INVOLVES KNOWLEDGE
Varela (1999) writes: âThus it seems more and more compelling to look at knowledgeâto understand understandingâin a manner that can only be called post-Cartesian; that is, knowledge appears more and more as being built from small domains composed of microworlds and microidentities. Behavioral repertoires vary throughout the animal kingdom, but what all living cognitive beings seem to have in common is know-how constituted on the basis of the concrete. Thus what we call general and abstract are aggregates of readiness-for-action. In other words, cognitive science is waking up to the simple fact that just being there, immediate coping, is far from simple or reflexive. Immediate coping is, in fact, the real âhard work,â since it took the longest evolutionary time to develop. The ability to make intentional, rational analyses during breakdowns appeared only recently and very rapidly in evolutionary termsâ (p. 18).
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P. 142: BUILDING A MACHINE THAT CAN WALK IS HARD
Brooks (2002) writes: âJudging by the projects chosen in the early days of AI, intelligence was thought to be best characterized as the things that highly educated male scientists found challenging. Projects included having a computer play chess, carry out integration