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During the summer of that year, prominent mainstream politicians on the right compared the Islamic center’s organizers—and Muslims writ large—to Nazis and other historic wartime enemies of the United States in comments that too often went unchallenged by members of the media and other politicians. Newt Gingrich, former speaker of the house, was the most visible and most mainstream voice to make this comparison:

Nazis don’t have the right to put up a sign next to the Holocaust museum in Washington,” […] We would never accept the Japanese putting up a site next to Pearl Harbor. […] There is no reason for us to accept a mosque next to the World Trade Center.10

Whatever one’s views on appropriateness of the center, the fact is that such extreme and indiscriminate anti-Muslim rhetoric helps to validate the worldview of our enemies—the premise that America’s wars are indeed wars against Islam. I said earlier in this chapter that Muslims who perpetuate a victimization mentality must accept some responsibility for the result. Non-Muslims who wish to define the entire religion of Islam as America’s enemy must also carry their share of that burden. You cannot tell someone, “You are my enemy,” and then blame them for believing you.

This in no way justifies or rationalizes the actions of those who translate their anger into violence, particularly terrorist violence, which is especially reprehensible for its focus on intentionally indiscriminate killing. The responsibility for such acts lies primarily with the individuals who commit them and those who explicitly encourage them to do so. The decision to step over the line and commit murder is inexcusable—but that doesn’t mean it has to be incomprehensible.

It’s fair game to challenge American Muslim leaders if they enable, excuse, or try to ignore the problem of radicalization—and some do—but those challenges must be thoughtful and made with an eye toward consequences, constructive dialogue, and moving through the impasse instead of deepening it. In turn, Muslim leaders must rise to the challenge of these times by directly confronting the problem of military jihadism rather than denying it exists or seeking to silence discussion with charges of Islamophobia and bigotry.

There must be an exit strategy for this discussion. We must preserve the constitutional rights and basic human respect due to American Muslims while changing the playing field to create conditions in which extremism cannot thrive. Those goals are not mutually exclusive—they are interdependent.

If principle and pragmatism are not enough reason to change the tone of the conversation, there is one more thing to consider. It would be not only dangerous but shameful to prove that our enemies were right about us all along.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It took a lot of help to make this book possible, and this list will certainly omit people who deserve to be thanked. For that I apologize in advance. I want to thank everyone who agreed to speak with me, but especially Tom Corrigan, formerly of the Joint Terrorism Task Force, who was generous not only with his time but also with crucial documentation that allowed me to present the words of the jihadists profiled herein. Former CIA analyst Mike Scheuer and former FBI agent Chris Voss, who now runs the Black Swan Group, helped stitch often-disparate threads together into a coherent whole. Alia Rashid sat down for two interviews— which were arranged with the help of Rashid’s attorney, Ken Wasserman—as did Ray Royer. Bilal Philips persisted through days of phone tag with a fourteen-hour time difference during Ramadan so that we could speak. There were many more, and each provided unique value. A number of people consented to speak on a not-for-attribution basis who could not have spoken otherwise.

Much of my work is based on documents, and many people were generous in sharing the primary source material that forms the core of the narrative. The Motley Rice