Justice_ What's the Right Thing to Do_ - Michael Sandel [95]
Politics and the Good Life
We can now see more clearly why, for Aristotle, politics is not one calling among others, but is essential to the good life. First, the laws of the polis inculcate good habits, form good character, and set us on the way to civic virtue. Second, the life of the citizen enables us to exercise capacities for deliberation and practical wisdom that would otherwise lie dormant. This is not the kind of thing we can do at home. We can sit on the sidelines and wonder what policies we would favor if we had to decide. But this is not the same as sharing in significant action and bearing responsibility for the fate of the community as a whole. We become good at deliberating only by entering the arena, weighing the alternatives, arguing our case, ruling and being ruled—in short, by being citizens.
Aristotle’s vision of citizenship is more elevated and strenuous than ours. For him, politics is not economics by other means. Its purpose is higher than maximizing utility or providing fair rules for the pursuit of individual interests. It is, instead, an expression of our nature, an occasion for the unfolding of our human capacities, an essential aspect of the good life.
Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery
Not everyone was included in the citizenship Aristotle celebrated. Women were ineligible, as were slaves. According to Aristotle, their natures did not suit them to be citizens. We now see such exclusion as an obvious injustice. It’s worth recalling that these injustices persisted for more than two thousand years after Aristotle wrote. Slavery was not abolished in the United States until 1865, and women won the right to vote only in 1920. Still, the historic persistence of these injustices does not exonerate Aristotle for accepting them.
In the case of slavery, Aristotle not only accepted it but offered a philosophical justification. It’s worth examining his defense of slavery to see what light it sheds on his political theory as a whole. Some see in Aristotle’s argument for slavery a defect in teleological thinking as such; others see it as misguided application of such thinking, beclouded by the prejudices of his time.
I don’t think Aristotle’s defense of slavery reveals a flaw that condemns his political theory as a whole. But it’s important to see the force of that thoroughgoing claim.
For Aristotle, justice is a matter of fit. To allocate rights is to look for the telos of social institutions, and to fit persons to the roles that suit them, the roles that enable them to realize their nature. Giving persons their due means giving them the offices and honors they deserve and the social roles that accord with their nature.
Modern political theories are uneasy with the notion of fit. Liberal theories of justice, from Kant to Rawls, worry that teleological conceptions are at odds with freedom. For them, justice is not about fit but about choice. To allocate rights is not to fit people to roles that suit their nature; it is to let people choose their roles for themselves.
From this point of view, the notions of telos and fit are suspect, even dangerous. Who is to say what role is fitting for me, or appropriate to my nature? If I’m not free to choose my social role for myself, I might well be forced into a role against my will. So the notion of fit can easily slide into slavery, if those in power decide that a certain group is somehow suited for a subordinate role.
Prompted by this worry, liberal political theory argues that social roles should be allocated by choice, not fit. Rather than fit people to roles we think will suit their nature, we should enable people to choose their roles for themselves.