Justice_ What's the Right Thing to Do_ - Michael Sandel [96]
But this conclusion is too quick. Aristotle’s defense of slavery is no proof against teleological thinking. On the contrary, Aristotle’s own theory of justice provides ample resources for a critique of his views on slavery. In fact, his notion of justice as fit is more morally demanding, and potentially more critical of existing allocations of work, than theories based on choice and consent. To see how this is so, let’s examine Aristotle’s argument.
For slavery to be just, according to Aristotle, two conditions must be met: it must be necessary, and it must be natural. Slavery is necessary, Aristotle argues, because someone must look after the household chores if citizens are to spend time in the assembly deliberating about the common good. The polis requires a division of labor. Unless we invent machines that could take care of all menial tasks, some people have to attend to the necessities of life so that others can be free to participate in politics.
So Aristotle concludes that slavery is necessary. But necessity is not enough. For slavery to be just, it must also be the case that certain persons are suited by their nature to perform this role.24 So Aristotle asks if there are “persons for whom slavery is the better and just condition, or whether the reverse is the case and all slavery is contrary to nature.”25 Unless there are such people, the political and economic need for slaves is not enough to justify slavery.
Aristotle concludes that such people exist. Some people are born to be slaves. They differ from ordinary people in the same way that the body differs from the soul. Such people “are by nature slaves, and it is better for them… to be ruled by a master.”26
“A man is thus by nature a slave if he is capable of becoming (and this is the reason why he also actually becomes) the property of another, and if he participates in reason to the extent of apprehending it in another, though destitute of it himself.27
“[J]ust as some are by nature free, so others are by nature slaves, and for these latter the condition of slavery is both beneficial and just.”28
Aristotle seems to sense something questionable in the claim he is making, because he quickly qualifies it: “But it is easy to see that those who hold an opposite view are also in a way correct.”29 Looking at slavery as it existed in the Athens of his day, Aristotle had to admit that the critics had a point. Many slaves found themselves in that condition for a purely contingent reason: they were formerly free people who had been captured in war. Their status as slaves had nothing to do with their being fit for the role. For them, slavery was not natural, but the result of bad luck. By Aristotle’s own standard, their slavery is unjust: “Not all those who are actually slaves, or actually freemen, are natural slaves or natural freemen.”30
How can you tell who is fit to be a slave? Aristotle asks. In principle, you would have to see who, if anyone, flourishes as a slave, and who chafes in the role or tries to flee. The need for force is a good indication that the slave in question is not suited to the role.31 For Aristotle, coercion is a sign of injustice, not because consent legitimates all roles, but because the need for force suggests an unnatural fit. Those who are cast in a role consistent with their nature don’t need to be forced.
For liberal political theory, slavery is unjust because it is coercive. For teleological theories, slavery is unjust because it is at odds with our nature; coercion is a symptom of the injustice, not the source of it. It is perfectly possible to explain, within the ethic of telos and fit, the injustice of slavery, and Aristotle goes some way (though not all the way) toward doing so.
The ethic of telos and fit actually sets a more demanding moral standard for justice in the workplace than does the liberal ethic of choice and consent.32 Consider