Lethal Trajectories - Michael Conley [167]
Clayton could sense the excitement as he thought, This is like the ninth inning of the seventh game of the World Series—everything is on the line.
“I’d like to start with a briefing from the CIA,” the president continued. “Tony, what’s the latest on the Al Mishari debriefing?”
“Thank you, Mr. President. It is no exaggeration to say that Al Mishari has literally given us the keys to the kingdom. He was privy to top security secrets, and for months he collected vital information to provide to us when the time was ripe. We have good reason to believe that Al Mishari’s defection is authentic, based on a deep disappointment in the regime and triggered by his superior officer’s refusal to intervene in the execution of his niece by stoning.”
A murmur ran through the room, and Clayton, thinking about his two daughters, wondered, What went through that poor woman’s mind as she was trapped in the ground, waiting to be hit by the stones that would snuff out her life? He shivered at the thought.
“Al Mishari claims to be one of only four people who knew the exact placement of the dirty bombs, the defenses around them, and the frequency codes to detonate them,” Mullen continued.
“With his departure,” asked an Army general, “why wouldn’t the Saudis just change the sites and frequencies?”
“Good question, General. For those who don’t know: to avoid any suspicion of a defection, Al Mishari ingeniously concocted an escape that was made to look like his F-15 fighter-bomber exploded in midair over the Persian Gulf. Our operatives reported that Al Mishari’s bailout was precision-perfect with nothing left to suggest his survival. This guy was no slouch behind the stick. It seems that Al Mishari’s commander, General Ali Jabar of the RSAF, shouldn’t have shared that information with him in the first place. Any change in their emplacements would require Ali Jabar to admit to his security breach—an act that would most surely lead to his immediate execution. As a precaution, Al Mishari gave us the satellite coordinates and advised us on the protocols to identify whether a location change is being made. We’ve seen no activity.”
The three- and four-star officers in the room nodded their heads in admiration of Al Mishari’s professionalism.
“That accounts for the locations, Tony, but what about the defense systems protecting the emplacements?” asked the president. “Surely they must be well guarded.”
“We asked that same question, Mr. President, and Al Mishari told us that once he made his decision to defect last November, he set out to learn everything he could about the dirty-bomb defenses. Access to these facilities was not a problem because his commander ordered him to visit all sites and report back to him. They were apparently searching for any excess radioactive material they could find to build more bombs. While there, he found the facility commanders all too eager to brag about their defense capabilities, and he found weaknesses in every site. He believes that all of the sites can be taken out, if approached properly.”
Jack McCarty asked, “Even if our forces were to penetrate the sites, wouldn’t the Saudis be able to electronically detonate the dirty bombs as soon as they were approached?”
“We believe our electronic warfare boys can jam all signals in and out of the facility without disrupting communications elsewhere. As a point of reference, after heavy convoy losses in our wars in Afghanistan and Iraq due to wirelessly activated IED bombs, the R&D boys at DARPA went to work on electronically jamming communications in a highly concentrated area—like within a hundred-meter diameter—without disrupting other communications. It’s called “PREW” technology, which stands for Precision Electronic Warfare. Anyway, long story