Lethal Trajectories - Michael Conley [168]
“Al Mishari also showed us how to dismantle the dirty bombs—which are pretty plain vanilla in design—and our Navy Seal and Special Forces demolition teams are practicing the techniques as I speak. Further, he has strongly recommended we take out communications in the command post in Riyadh as an added fail-safe precaution. We are now targeting this site for electronic warfare; we’ll use a converted B-2 stealth bomber flying at 42,000 feet near Riyadh to jam signals.”
“One other detail, Mr. President,” Mullen continued, “and it’s important. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991, the Saudis recognized how vulnerable they were. As a defensive deterrent, they extensively mined their oil infrastructure with conventional explosives. The idea was to render their oil fields inoperable for an extended time, leaving little but sand for any would-be conquerors. Some explosives may still be in place, and we could have some collateral damage to the fields. Unlike dirty bombs, however, damage from conventional bombs could be quickly repaired.”
“Thanks, Tony,” said the president, fascinated by the intelligence and countermeasures proposed. “What else did Al Mishari tell us?”
“He literally mapped out the Saudi order of battle: their troop dispositions, fortified lines, defense plan, air and ground assets, and most important, he outlined how to penetrate the secret base in the southern desert where four atomic bombs are in storage. He also confirmed our intelligence reports that most of the Saudi armored units deployed earlier in the protectorates of Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE had been pulled back and redeployed along the borders.”
“Thanks Tony. Now, Thurmond, would you and your team go over the main battle plan for Operation Steel Drum?”
“Yes, Mr. President, glad to do so,” SecDef Thompson eagerly replied.
“As you know, we’ve been building up our land, sea, and air forces in the Middle East over the past half year, and we’ve worked closely with the Brits, China, and others in the effort. Combined, they’ll be contributing the equivalent of seven divisions to the effort. Our forces alone are more than enough to do the job, but if there’s one thing we learned from the Iraq War, it’s that there has to be a sufficient troop density to occupy the territory after the battle is won so that security can be maintained.”
Clayton recalled his many discussions with Lin Cheng on postwar security in Saudi Arabia. The 2003 Iraq War taught them the folly of disbanding an entire army and putting tens of thousands of angry young soldiers out on the street, jobless and packing weapons. By taking out a couple of layers of the officer corps and disbanding the elite Royal Saudi units, they could maintain internal security by channeling those soldiers into a military police force. China also agreed to supply security forces under UN direction.
“Are our forces ready, Thurmond?”
“They’ve been in a high state of readiness for some time, Mr. President, and they can launch an attack within 96 hours—four days,” Thompson declared with obvious pride.
“How will this dovetail, from a timing point of view, with the preliminary dirty-bomb demolition movements Tony has just described?” Clayton asked.
Secretary Thompson brought up a map of Saudi Arabia on the wall screen. “Mr. President, in keeping with Operation Steel Drum, six hours prior to the main attack a number of preparatory actions will take place. It will start with a major electronic jamming effort over key Saudi oil fields, in the Riyadh Control Center, and the nuclear facility in the south Saudi desert. We are confident that we can take out their ability to detonate the dirty bombs remotely as well as disrupt general communications.”
Thompson gestured to the map and continued, “Within minutes of this effort, a large number of Seal and