Mistakes Were Made - Carol Tavris [133]
25 Quoted in Tracy, Who Killed Stephanie Crowe?, p. 175; note 11.
26 Fred E. Inbau, John E. Reid, Joseph P. Buckley, and Brian C. Jayne (2001), Criminal Interrogation and Confessions (fourth ed.). Gaithersburg, MD: Aspen Publishers, p. 212.
27 Inbau et al., p. 429.
28 One of the most thorough dissections of the Reid Technique and the Inbau et al. manual is Deborah Davis and William T. O’Donohue (2004), “The Road to Perdition: ‘Extreme Influence’ Tactics in the Interrogation Room,” in W. T. O’Donohue and E. Levensky (eds.), Handbook of Forensic Psychology, pp. 897–996. New York: Elsevier Academic Press.
29 Louis C. Senese (2005), Anatomy of Interrogation Themes: The Reid Technique of Interviewing. Chicago: John E. Reid & Associates, p. 32.
30 Quoted also in Saul Kassin (2005), “On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?” American Psychologist, 60, pp. 215–228.
31 Saul M. Kassin and Christina T. Fong (1999), “I’m Innocent! Effects of Training on Judgments of Truth and Deception in the Interrogation Room,” Law and Human Behavior, 23, pp. 499–516. In another study, Kassin and his colleagues recruited prison inmates who were instructed to give a full confession of their own crime and a made-up confession of a crime committed by another inmate. College students and police investigators judged the videotaped confessions. The overall accuracy rate did not exceed chance, but the police were more confident in their judgments. See Saul M. Kassin, Christian A. Meissner, and Rebecca J. Norwick (2005), “‘I’d know a false confession if I saw one’: A Comparative Study of College Students and Police Investigators,” Law and Human Behavior, 29, pp. 211–227.
32 This is why innocent people are more likely than guilty people to waive their Miranda rights to silence and to having a lawyer. In one of Saul Kassin’s experiments, seventy-two participants who were guilty or innocent of stealing $100 were interrogated by a male detective whose demeanor was neutral, sympathetic, or hostile, and who then tried to get them to give up their Miranda rights. Those who were innocent were far more likely to sign a waiver than those who were guilty, and by a large margin—81 percent to 36 percent. Two thirds of the innocent suspects even signed the waiver when the detective adopted a hostile pose, shouting at them, “I know you did this and I don’t want to hear any lies!” The reason they signed, they later said, was they thought that only guilty people need a lawyer, whereas they had done nothing wrong and had nothing to hide. “It appears,” the experimenters concluded mournfully, “that people have a naïve faith in the power of their own innocence to set them free.” Saul M. Kassin and Rebecca J. Norwick (2004), “Why People Waive Their Miranda Rights: The Power of Innocence,” Law and Human Behavior, 28, pp. 211–221.
33 Drizin and Leo, “The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World,” p. 948; note 2.
34 For example, one teenager, Kharey Wise, was told that the jogger was hit with a “very heavy object” and then was asked, “Was she hit with a stone or brick?” Wise said first that it was a rock; moments later, that it was a brick. He said one of the others had pulled out a knife and cut the jogger’s shirt off, which wasn’t true; there were no knife cuts. Saul Kassin, “False Confessions and the Jogger Case,” The New York Times op-ed, November 1, 2002.
35 New York v. Kharey Wise, Kevin Richardson, Antron McCray, Yusef Salaam, and Raymond Santana: Affirmation in response to motion to vacate judgment of conviction, Indictment No. 4762/89, by Assistant District Attorney Nancy Ryan, December 5, 2002. Quote on page 46.
36 Adam Liptak, “Prosecutors Fight DNA Use for Exoneration,” The New York Times, August 29, 2003. See also Daniel Medwed, “The Zeal Deal,” for a review