Safe Food_ Bacteria, Biotechnology, and Bioterrorism - Marion Nestle [175]
The multiple antibiotic resistance of this Salmonella strain raised particular alarms. As discussed in chapters 1 and 6, most antibiotics in the United States are fed to farm animals for nontherapeutic purposes, a practice that selects for antibiotic-resistant bacteria. This problem was the focus of a Pew Commission investigation (in which I participated), which recommended immediate reduction in the use of nontherapeutic antibiotics in animal agriculture.55
Congress considered legislation, but the meat industry opposed it. The American Meat Institute said restrictions on antibiotic use “will jeopardize the industry’s ability to protect animal health, animal welfare and the food supply.” A coalition of twenty meat producer organizations wrote the White House that antibiotics were vital to livestock and poultry production, and restrictions “are not supported by any conclusive scientific evidence.” The American Veterinary Medical Association also opposed restrictions. The Pew report, it said, “contains significant flaws and major deviations from both science and reality. These missteps lead to dangerous and under-informed recommendations about the nature of our food system—and shocking recommendations for interventions that are scarcely commensurate with risk.”56 Despite the evident importance of antibiotics to human health, self-interest politics makes this issue—as well as the others discussed here—difficult to resolve.
Taken together, these incidents ought to have provided all the evidence Congress might need to enact food safety legislation. Collectively, they demonstrate that without such legislation, food companies are likely to continue to cut safety corners, lobby against having to produce food safely, and collude with federal agencies to overlook safety hazards—regardless of threats to public health. And because animal wastes (USDA-regulated) are the ultimate source of pathogens on leafy greens and raw cookie dough (FDA-regulated), these incidents also argue for regulation by one agency, not two.
TOWARD A MORE EFFECTIVE FOOD SAFETY SYSTEM
In 2004, Tommy Thompson announced his resignation as secretary of health and human services with these now famous words: “I, for the life of me, cannot understand why terrorists have not attacked our food supply because it is so easy to do.” Fears of bioterrorism induced Congress to require the FDA to implement rules about registration and import shipments, but that was all.57
You might think, as I do, that the surest way to prevent food bioterrorism would be to enact a comprehensive food safety system. Such a system would not only protect against microbial biohazards, but also those that might be posed by old and new technologies such as mercury in fish from coal-burning power plants, the cloning of food animals, genetic modification of animals and fish, chemicals leaching from plastics, and nanotechnology.
You also might think that the recent spate of outbreaks and recalls would have induced Congress to take action. In 2007, Michael Taylor told Congress, “The sad truth is that we have no system for managing multi-state foodborne illness outbreaks. . . . Congress must act to solve this problem.” How? By enacting what food safety advocates in and out of government had been recommending for years: a single food agency responsible for overseeing mandatory HACCP (or its euphemistic equivalent, “preventive controls”) for all foods, from farm to table.58
With Congress unwilling to take on this challenge, the alternative is to try a stepwise approach, beginning with fixing the FDA. In the wake of the 2007 pet food recalls, the FDA’s Science Board released a scathing report on the agency’s lack of scientific and financial resources. It pointed out that from 1988