Safe Food_ Bacteria, Biotechnology, and Bioterrorism - Marion Nestle [176]
At the time he made these statements, Taylor was a professor at George Washington University. Because of his previous connection to Monsanto, antibiotechnology advocates considered him the prime example of how the revolving door favors corporate over public interests. In 2009, despite such concerns, he was reappointed to the FDA with responsibility for implementing whatever food safety legislation Congress chose to enact. Congress was considering bills aimed at fixing the FDA. Because of Taylor’s work in the mid-1990s, the USDA’s rules did not need much fixing; they mostly needed to be enforced.
In the interim, the FDA did what it could to unblock regulations put on hold by the previous administration. In 2009, it implemented rules for shell eggs first proposed in 2004, issued guidance (still voluntary) for melons, tomatoes, and leafy greens, and speeded up its warning systems. It also showed hopeful signs of collaborating with the USDA on common food safety problems. The USDA does not usually deal with the safety of leafy greens, for example, but large growers asked the USDA to establish a marketing agreement to “facilitate the practical application” of the FDA voluntary guidance. Producers who signed on to the agreement would be obliged to follow GMPs. This might appear to be real progress, but never underestimate politics. Small growers strongly opposed the marketing agreement on the grounds that adhering to GMPs puts them at a competitive disadvantage.60
Overall, safety practices remain voluntary as of early 2010. For mandatory food safety, Congress would have to act. As this book goes to press, creating a food safety system that unites the functions of the FDA and the USDA seems politically unfeasible. Instead, Congress seems likely to pass legislation designed to strengthen the FDA. The bills authorize the FDA to require science-based (HACCP-like) safety standards for all foods from farm to table, and to demand recalls, retain contaminated products, and conduct other long-awaited enforcement measures. As might be expected, these bills were vigorously opposed by industrial food producers. But they also were opposed by producers of local, organic, and sustainable foods who, understandably, wanted regulations more appropriate to their smaller scale of operations.61
No matter how these issues resolve, the proposed legislation falls far short of what is needed. The many industry critics of a unified food safety system argue that a single agency and mandatory requirements will not end foodborne illness; as long as humans prepare food, accidents will happen. Yes, but the single agency idea is worth pursuing because neither the separate agencies nor voluntary actions by food companies have been able to prevent more frequent and deadly outbreaks. We only have one food system, and it makes sense to put one agency in charge of it. At issue is how to achieve an effective food safety system. For this, we need a much higher level of public dread and outrage. It is time for food safety to join the food revolution.
APPENDIX
THE SCIENCE OF PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY
IN WRITING THIS BOOK, I TRIED TO MAKE THE SCIENTIFIC ISSUES accessible to general readers, omitting technical details but retaining accuracy. The purpose of this appendix is to provide a bit more information about the underlying science of food biotechnology. Although it is not necessary to know very much about this science in order to understand its political implications, a grasp of fundamental concepts, approaches, and interpretations can help bridge the gap between science-based and value-based approaches