Safe Food_ Bacteria, Biotechnology, and Bioterrorism - Marion Nestle [48]
Soon after, the USDA withdrew its discretionary inspection plans for “further study,” an action considered a sure sign that the idea had failed.15 A year later, yet another National Research Council report, this time of the streamlined inspection system, concluded that such a system could not possibly protect the food supply unless “the reduced oversight by government inspectors is . . . compensated by a total commitment to product quality on the part of industry.”16 Such a commitment seemed unlikely.
E. COLI O157:H7 OUTBREAK INDUCES ACTION: JACK IN THE BOX, 1992–1993
If a single incident forced federal agencies to recognize the need for improvements in food safety regulation, it surely must be that of the disastrous December 1992 outbreak of E. coli O157:H7. Four young children in the Pacific Northwest died early in this outbreak. All were found to have eaten hamburgers at Jack in the Box restaurants. By February 1993, when the contaminated meat had been recalled and no new cases were emerging, Washington State alone had reported 400 cases and 100 hospitalizations, and another 100 cases had occurred in other states. Jack in the Box hamburgers were implicated in more than 90% of these cases.17
Despite the compelling circumstantial evidence, the source of the outbreak was not immediately apparent. The meat came from a California meat packer who said that his company had complied with federal regulations “and like other plants, has Federal inspectors who work on the premises” (translation: it’s the USDA’s fault).18 Officials suspected that the meat had been contaminated in the slaughterhouse (it’s the slaughterer’s fault), but could not immediately confirm that suspicion.
Further investigation revealed that Jack in the Box restaurants had been following then-current FDA guidelines to cook hamburger to 140°F, a temperature too low to completely kill E. coli O157:H7. Six months prior to the outbreak, however, Washington State issued its own rules requiring hamburger to be cooked to 155°F, but Jack in the Box officials somehow missed that notification. The chain’s president, Mr. Robert J. Nugent, was forced to admit that his 60 Washington State restaurants cooked meat below the 155°F standard. In testimony before a congressional committee, he explained that the company’s procedures specified an internal temperature of 140°F but that the average cooking temperature in 1992 had been 154°F—a temperature just one degree below the state standard and high enough to kill most bacteria. Federal investigators, however, disputed that statement; they had found hamburgers cooked to just 120°F.19 Despite such findings, Mr. Nugent also appeared to shift responsibility elsewhere—to meat processors and USDA inspectors—when he testified.
Although our cooking procedures meet all Federal standards, we have increased cooking time and cooking temperature for our hamburgers and retrained our grill chefs. . . . We also have offered to pay the medical expenses of those who may have become ill after eating at one of our restaurants. But it is important to note that the contaminated meat that was infected by the E. coli O157:H7 bacteria before delivery to our restaurants had passed all USDA inspections. Every one of our chefs had carefully followed all Federal food preparation standards.20
The consequences of the Jack in the Box outbreak were immediate. The parent company, Foodmakers, which earned two-thirds of its $1.3 billion in annual revenue from the chain, lost 30% of its stock market value. Despite attempting to shift blame elsewhere, the company offered to pay medical expenses for the victims and immediately recruited a nationally known expert to revamp its procedures. Eventually, its revised system set a food safety standard for the industry.
Perhaps as a result of the hearings, President Bill Clinton authorized the hiring of 160 more meat inspectors, although 400 positions still were left vacant as a result