Spycraft - Melton [292]
10 The Liberia Official Gazette, Vol. L, 2.
11 Crown interview.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 The New York Times, December 5, 1977.
15 The New York Times, June 13, 1987.
16 Cambridge World Gazetteer, 122.
17 The New York Times, January 13, 1987.
18 The New York Times, November 5, 1996.
19 Dr. Robert Managhan, “Trends in African Forgeries,” Studies in Intelligence, 19:1, 1975, 14.
20 Crown interview.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Managhan, “Trends in African Forgeries,” 14.
24 Crown interview.
25 The Liberia Official Gazette.
26 Helms, A Look over My Shoulder, 93.
27 Ibid., 95.
28 Ibid., 99. Rosters containing the names of the fabricators, known as “burn lists,” were circulated among the Allied intelligence services as a means of limiting the damage caused by the perpetrators and maintaining integrity of intelligence information. Fifty years later, similar mechanisms, called “watch lists,” were created to identify terrorists, while unverifiable, but seeming plausible “hoax” data manufactured by unknown sources permeated the Internet.
29 Ibid.,110.
30 Managhan, Trends in African Forgeries, 13.
31 Peter Deriabin, Watchdogs of Terror (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1972), 94.
32 James Ridgeway, Blood in the Face (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1990), 30, 32.
33 Ibid., 32.
34 U.S. House of Representatives, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress (February 19, 1980), 6.
35 U.S. Senate, Hearing Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate (June 2, 1961), 6.
36 U.S. House of Representatives, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress (February 19, 1980), 65.
37 U.S. Senate, Hearing Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate (June 2, 1961), 6.
38 Ibid., 22.
39 Ibid., 18.
40 Kalugin, The First Directorate, 137.
41 David A. Crown, “Political Forgeries in the Middle East,” Studies in Intelligence, 22:2, Central Intelligence Agency, 1978, 10.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., 9.
44 Managhan, Trends in African Forgeries, 14.
45 Ibid., 12.
46 Ibid., 11.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., 211.
49 U.S. House of Representatives, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress (February 19, 1980), 69.
50 The Journal of Intelligence History (1:1, 2001), 62.
51 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 238.
52 Ibid., 224.
53 Ibid.
54 David A. Spetrino, “Aids Disinformation,” Studies in Intelligence, 32:4, Central Intelligence Agency, 1988, 10.
55 Ibid., 11.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., 9.
58 Ibid., 12.
59 The Washington Post, January 25, 2005.
60 Ibid.
61 Markus Wolf, Man Without a Face (New York: Public Affairs, 1997), 289.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., 290. Wolf writes, “We left [Sudan] in 1971 and never returned.”
64 Crown interview.
65 Soon after the assassinations, a variety of credible reports surfaced that linked the late PLO Chairman, Yassir Arafat, directly to the killings of Noel and Moore. However, the U.S. Department of Justice concluded in 1986 that it lacked the evidence to bring an indictment against Arafat and argued further that if such evidence existed the potential for compromise of national security information would likely preclude it from being disclosed. See: David A. Korn, Assassination in Khartoum