Spycraft - Melton [293]
66 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004). “Monograph on 9/11 and Terrorist Travel,” Chapter 3, 1.
67 Ibid., 22.
68 Crown interview.
69 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, “Monograph on 9/11 and Terrorist Travel,” Chapter 3, 1.
70 “Redbook 1986” booklet published by OTS.
71 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, “Monograph on 9/11 and Terrorist Travel,” Chapter 3, 1.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., 12.
74 Ibid., 22.
CHAPTER NINETEEN
1 Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 3-5.
2 Ibid., 11.
3 Concise Dictionary of World History, 336.
4 Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), 6.
5 Ibid., 13.
6 Ammonium nitrate and diesel fuel combine to produce an explosive of the type used in the 1993 attack against the World Trade Center and again in April 1995 against the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.
CHAPTER TWENTY
1 The importance and difficulty of selecting the “right” people for intelligence missions was one of the important lessons the CIA learned from OSS. The OSS recruitment experience was compiled and published by the OSS Assessment Staff in Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel for the Office of Strategic Services (New York: Rinehart & Company, 1948).
2 Jerrold M. Post, “The Anatomy of Treason,” Studies in Intelligence, 19:2 Central Intelligence Agency, 1975, 37.
3 Ibid., 36.
4 OSS found this to be an immediate problem. Since recruiters for OSS were not allowed to name the organization for which the individual would be working and did not know in what capacity the recruit would be working, the “pitch” talked about “mysterious, exciting overseas assignments.” This attracted “the bored, the pathologically adventuresome, the neurotically inclined to danger, and psychopaths.” The latter have a particular ability to make good short-term impressions. Structured assessment attempted to identify and weed out those who would be a danger to themselves, others, and the mission. See: Donald W. MacKinnon, “The OSS Assessment Program,” Studies in Intelligence, 23:3, Central Intelligence Agency, 1979, 22-23.
5 David Wise, Nightmover: How Aldrich Ames Sold the CIA to the KGB for 4.6 million (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 114.
6 Golytsin, a KGB major in the First Chief Directorate, defected in December 1961. Nosenko, a Soviet security officer, defected in 1964. Both had access to sensitive counterintelligence information about worldwide Soviet operations. They offered explosive and contradictory information particularly surrounding the KGB’s relationship with Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy. See: Ranelagh, The Agency, 404-409, 563-568, and Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors, 151-158, 173-176, for detailed accounts of the two cases.
7 See: J. F. Winne and J. W. Gittinger, “An Introduction to the Personality Assessment System,” Journal of Clinical Psychology. Monograph Supplement No. 38, April 1973. The PAS as used by OTS was an adaptation of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale that had been developed by psychologist David Wechsler. Measurements along the PAS scale were designed to predict an individual’s behavior in various situations.
8 To OTS officers and many “old hands” in operations, Jeffrey Richelson’s work, The Wizards of Langley, on the history of the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology, incorrectly bestows the wizard title on engineers and scientists. Ask a case officer or a tech, “Who are the wizards?” and he or she will likely reply, “Those are the shrinks in OTS.”
9 In the mid-1990s, after the collapse of the USSR, requirements for graphological operational assessments decreased to the point that the service no longer required