Super Bowl Monday_ From the Persian Gulf to the Shores of West Florida - Adam Lazarus [111]
Even had Ingram made the catch, Leonard Smith was in perfect position to make the tackle short of the goal line. (Of course, that evening, Ingram’s penchant for breaking seemingly certain tackles had already produced one impossible third-down conversion.)
Trailing by just two points, Parcells sent out the kicking unit. And for the second time in two weeks, his reserve kicker, Matt Bahr, stroked through a go-ahead, fourth-quarter field goal.
After a somewhat slow start, New York’s carefully crafted offensive strategy of controlling both the ball and the clock—taking “the air out of the ball” —had yielded tremendous results. On four consecutive possessions, beginning with Stephen Baker’s touchdown late in the first half and ending with Bahr’s fourth-quarter field goal, the Giants produced seventeen points and ate up 259 yards.
But two additional stats were even more incredible. Over the course of those four drives, the Giants ran forty-three plays while consuming twenty-two minutes and forty-eight seconds of the game clock. (By contrast, during the entire game, Buffalo held the ball for just over nineteen minutes.) Win or lose, the offense more than met Parcells’ pregame objective of shortening the game.
Parcells was glad to reclaim the lead, but he knew the Giants had missed an opportunity.
“We had had a real good opportunity to score a touchdown down on the goal line,” Parcells recalled years later. “Had [Jeff Wright] not made that play, we would have walked in for a touchdown. But he did make it, and it forced us to kick a field goal. And that’s what kept the game close.”
From the moment Buffalo’s offense retook the field, the Giants’ lead looked even more tenuous. Back-to-back plays to Thurman Thomas—a run and a reception—garnered nineteen yards.
Thomas rested along the sideline, and, as was the case several times that night, the Buffalo offensive immediately stalled with him there. Short runs by Kenneth Davis and Kelly—he couldn’t find anyone open amid the sea of defensive backs—pinned Buffalo with a third and long of their own. And while the Giants’ 60 percent (nine of fifteen) third-down conversion rate at that point in the game had been magnificent, on third down the Bills were virtually anemic. Thus far, on that most critical of downs, Buffalo failed to convert each occasion.
When Kelly darted a perfect pass toward the left sideline, the third-down woes continued. Bills receiver Al Edwards was beyond the yardage marker and cradling the ball until a vicious hit by cornerback Perry Williams knocked Edwards backward on his heels. He dropped the football before hitting the ground: no catch, incomplete pass. The Bills would have to punt.
Less than six minutes now remained in the fourth quarter and the Bills still trailed 20-19. Given New York’s ball hogging, the Bills knew they might not get the ball back. A few Giants first downs would mean the Giants could salt away the game.
Rick Tuten came out to punt for the sixth time. The Bills punt team wasn’t accustomed to so much work: Buffalo punted only three times in their previous two games. Still, the kick coverage in Super Bowl XXV had been exceptional.
For a team that looked to generate yardage and points any way possible, Dave Meggett’s contributions (he returned punts for touchdowns in both 1989 and 1990, and led the NFL in return yardage both those seasons) had been crucial for New York. But after Meggett began the game