Super Bowl Monday_ From the Persian Gulf to the Shores of West Florida - Adam Lazarus [112]
Meggett’s sixth opportunity, however, nearly broke the back of the Buffalo Bills. He fielded the ball at his own fourteen-yard line, drifted right, then scurried upfield. A trio of well-positioned blocks from the punt-return team sealed off a wide lane, which Meggett saw. What he did not see—until it was too late—was Steve Tasker.
Tasker, the former Houston Oilers castoff, that year earned his first of a record seven Pro Bowl appearances as the designated special-team ace. And in the Super Bowl, he went head-to-head with his counterpart, the NFC special-teams selection, New York Giant Reyna Thompson. Along with Everson Walls, Thompson jammed Tasker at the snap, then ran downfield, attempting to keep him away from the returner.
“The two guys were doing a really good job of doubling me, they really had me and they did a nice job all night, but I ducked down low, like went to the ground and dove between them, their legs, and just tripped Dave up. I got a piece of him, enough to make the tackle,” Tasker remembered years later. “When I got up to look I thought, ‘Oh my gosh, it was a good thing I got that guy, ’cause he would have been gone.’”
With Tuten the lone player in position behind Tasker, had Meggett avoided the tackle, he might have stretched a sixteen-yard return into the eighty-six-yard touchdown that effectively ended Super Bowl XXV.
“Dave Meggett had a colossal hole if Tasker doesn’t knock him down!” Dan Dierdorf noted on the broadcast.
“That could have [gone] the distance!” Gifford added.
Tasker’s tackle saved the Bills from potential disaster. Still, two plays into the drive, New York’s ground game started dealing Buffalo a slow death. Back-to-back rushes by Anderson bagged a first down for the Giants. Those fourteen yards pushed Anderson beyond the one-hundred-yard threshold and consumed time off the clock. Three minutes forty-five seconds remained when the Giants next snapped the ball. And after a third straight run (Meggett gave Anderson a brief rest on the sideline), Buffalo had to spend their first time-out.
Parcells and his “conservative” offense caught Buffalo off guard with a quick pass. Bavaro nabbed the reception, his fourth of the final period. The play picked up seven yards, creating another momentous third-down matchup between the Giants offense and Bills defense.
Knowing that a first down meant he could drain most, if not all, of the time remaining, Parcells did not want to make a hasty move. Hostetler let the play clock run down to one second, then called a time-out and headed over to the sideline to discuss their options. Running the ball would keep the clock moving but most likely would not gain the first down. Throwing the ball could gain the first down, but an incompletion would stop the clock and allow Buffalo to keep one of their time-outs.
New York’s repeated success, throwing passes to Bavaro—especially in the fourth quarter—tempted Parcells.
“We really didn’t want to give the ball back to them,” Parcells said. “The decision came down to, should we try to win the game with that same play, because we thought that play was there, or should we try to run the clock and maybe make Buffalo use another time-out and run the shotgun draw.”
Following the discussion with his offensive coordinator, Parcells asked his quarterback.
“What do you think about quarterback draw?” he asked.
Standing face-to-face—the two men who, for years, didn’t see eye to eye—debated the issue. Pressed for a decision, they settled on the shotgun draw, a decision that caused Parcells great angst over the next fifteen minutes.
New York aligned in a four-receiver set, with Meggett beside Hostetler. During the cadence, Meggett motioned out, leaving an empty backfield. Upon catching the snap, Hostetler set up as if he were looking for a receiver. The Bills defense didn’t succumb to the misdirection.
Defensive coordinator Walt Corey had chosen to pressure the Giants,