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re united as a group. And we' re either going to come as a group, or we' ll not come as a

group." It was a very high-risk strategy because by making demands upon Shearson, they

might look at us and say, "We' re not taking your demands, fellas--you're fired," or they

might just say, "We' re not taking your demands," and then we would have to quit.

Because we'd make that the option--"You either take our demands or we're gone."

So as that idea was being formed that afternoon, we sort of stopped the meeting and

looked at Bob [Genirs], and Bob was sitting--there was a long couch in the office, a very

long couch--he was sitting there with the other fellas. And I said, "Bob, you' re the

longest-term partner, one of the longest-term partners at Lehman, certainly the longestterm partner in this room. You have your whole financial security at risk, what you

promised your family you would get out of this business. And if they fire us, or we have

to quit, you 're going to lose all that. So, why don't you leave [the room] now before we

make a decision--which we're probably going to make--and if it works, you' re with us,

and if it doesn't, you can go on." So the room got quiet, and we fully expected Bob to get

up and say, "Okay, guys, I' ll step out now." But we looked over and . . . he was shaking

his head back and forth, sort of looking at the floor. And all of a sudden, he looks up, and

he goes, "I' m with you guys. I want to be part of this. Put my name on the list." And we

spent about two seconds trying to say, "Bob you don't wanna do that," but it was pretty

clear that Bob wanted to do that. And those of us who were there will never forget that.

Pettit also privately told Steve Lessing that he should feel free to leave with no ill will.

Lessing was by the far the youngest of the Ponderosa Boys. His father-in-law was

Andrew J. Melton Jr., the former chairman of Dean Witter Reynolds. He could start over.

But Lessing did not leave. In fact, he set up a meeting between Pettit and Melton. The

two met and Melton made it clear that Dean Witter might be prepared to take all of LCPI,

which gave Pettit some leverage.

"When we held that meeting we really did feel we could lose everything," remembers

Moncreiffe.

Yet everyone was prepared to follow Pettit. "The Captain" had put his livelihood on the

line for them.

When Glucksman heard about the insurrection his proteges were cooking up, he was

livid. He had made his own peace with the deal. After all, he was taking $15.6 million for

standing down. Someone close to Pettit remembers Glucksman screaming at him: "You'

re going to fail! You' re scum!"

"Chris was so disheartened," says this person. "He was always respectful of rank, and

Lew Glucksman was older. I mean, Chris still called people like that 'sir. ' But Chris

thought he was doing the right thing, sticking with the people of Lehman. And that is

why he didn't leave."

Pettit told that video camera that Moncreiffe called him at 10 the night before they were

due to deliver their ultimatum to Robinson and asked him, "What do you think's going to

happen?"

"I said, 'I think what's going to happen is this: I think Lew 's going to fire us as soon as

we get in in the morning so that we' re not partners anymore, so we don't have to sign a

noncompete and the issue goes away. That's what I think is going to happen.'"

He was wrong. A short time later, American Express agreed to all the demands of the

rebels. "I don't remember Chris calling a meeting to announce what had happened, but I

do recall word getting out that we were all safe, and we were jubilant," says Bob Shapiro.

Moncreiffe and Pettit got their terms and finally signed. LCPI, and all the people in it,

were kept together. What the press reports never recorded was that some, including

Moncreiffe, feared that the name Lehman might have been eradicated from the new

merged entity of Shearson and Lehman had Pettit not held out. Peter Cohen emphatically