The Economist [31]
a carpenter: first, you discover some one with a turn for carpentry, and then do all you can to get possession of him.[4] Or do you educate your bailiffs yourself?
[4] The steward, like the carpenter, and the labourers in general, would, as a rule, be a slave. See below, xxi. 9.
Isch. Most certainly the latter, Socrates; I try to educate them, as you say, myself; and with good reason. He who is properly to fill my place and manage my affairs when I am absent, my "alter ego,"[5] needs but to have my knowledge; and if I am fit myself to stand at the head of my own business, I presume I should be able to put another in possession of my knowledge.[6]
[5] Or, "my other self."
[6] Lit. "to teach another what I know myself."
Soc. Well then, the first thing he who is properly to take your place when absent must possess is goodwill towards you and yours; for without goodwill, what advantage will there be in any knowledge whatsoever which your bailiff may possess?
Isch. None, Socrates; and I may tell you that a kindly disposition towards me and mine is precisely what I first endeavour to instil.
Soc. And how, in the name of all that is holy, do you pick out whom you will and teach him to have kindly feeling towards yourself and yours?
Isch. By kindly treatment of him, to be sure, whenever the gods bestow abundance of good things upon us.
Soc. If I take your meaning rightly, you would say that those who enjoy your good things grow well disposed to you and seek to render you some good?
Isch. Yes, for of all instruments to promote good feeling this I see to be the best.
Soc. Well, granted the man is well disposed to you does it therefore follow, Ischomachus, that he is fit to be your bailiff? It cannot have escaped your observation that albeit human beings, as a rule, are kindly disposed towards themselves, yet a large number of them will not apply the attention requisite to secure for themselves those good things which they fain would have.
Isch. Yes, but believe me, Socrates, when I seek to appoint such men as bailiffs, I teach them also carefulness and application.[7]
[7] {epimeleia} is a cardinal virtue with the Greeks, or at any rate with Xenophon, but it has no single name in English.
Soc. Nay, now in Heaven's name, once more, how can that be? I always thought it was beyond the power of any teacher to teach these virtues.[8]
[8] For the Socratic problem {ei arete didakte} see Grote, "H. G." viii. 599.
Isch. Nor is it possible, you are right so far, to teach such excellences to every single soul in order as simply as a man might number off his fingers.
Soc. Pray, then, what sort of people have the privilege?[9] Should you mind pointing them out to me with some distinctness?
[9] Lit. "what kind of people can be taught them? By all means signify the sort to me distinctly."
Ishc. Well, in the first place, you would have some difficulty in making intemperate people diligent--I speak of intemperance with regard to wine, for drunkenness creates forgetfulness of everything which needs to be done.
Soc. And are persons devoid of self-control in this respect the only people incapable of diligence and carefulness? or are there others in like case?
Isch. Certainly, people who are intemperate with regard to sleep, seeing that the sluggard with his eyes shut cannot do himself or see that others do what is right.
Soc. What then?[10] Are we to regard these as the only people incapable of being taught this virtue of carefulness? or are there others in a like condition?
[10] Or, "What then--is the list exhausted? Are we to suppose that these are the sole people . . ."
Isch. Surely we must include the slave to amorous affection.[11] Your woeful lover[12] is incapable of being taught attention to anything beyond one single object.[13] No light task, I take it, to discover any hope or occupation sweeter to him than that which now employs him, his care for his beloved, nor, when the call for action comes,[14] will it be easy to invent worse punishment than that
[4] The steward, like the carpenter, and the labourers in general, would, as a rule, be a slave. See below, xxi. 9.
Isch. Most certainly the latter, Socrates; I try to educate them, as you say, myself; and with good reason. He who is properly to fill my place and manage my affairs when I am absent, my "alter ego,"[5] needs but to have my knowledge; and if I am fit myself to stand at the head of my own business, I presume I should be able to put another in possession of my knowledge.[6]
[5] Or, "my other self."
[6] Lit. "to teach another what I know myself."
Soc. Well then, the first thing he who is properly to take your place when absent must possess is goodwill towards you and yours; for without goodwill, what advantage will there be in any knowledge whatsoever which your bailiff may possess?
Isch. None, Socrates; and I may tell you that a kindly disposition towards me and mine is precisely what I first endeavour to instil.
Soc. And how, in the name of all that is holy, do you pick out whom you will and teach him to have kindly feeling towards yourself and yours?
Isch. By kindly treatment of him, to be sure, whenever the gods bestow abundance of good things upon us.
Soc. If I take your meaning rightly, you would say that those who enjoy your good things grow well disposed to you and seek to render you some good?
Isch. Yes, for of all instruments to promote good feeling this I see to be the best.
Soc. Well, granted the man is well disposed to you does it therefore follow, Ischomachus, that he is fit to be your bailiff? It cannot have escaped your observation that albeit human beings, as a rule, are kindly disposed towards themselves, yet a large number of them will not apply the attention requisite to secure for themselves those good things which they fain would have.
Isch. Yes, but believe me, Socrates, when I seek to appoint such men as bailiffs, I teach them also carefulness and application.[7]
[7] {epimeleia} is a cardinal virtue with the Greeks, or at any rate with Xenophon, but it has no single name in English.
Soc. Nay, now in Heaven's name, once more, how can that be? I always thought it was beyond the power of any teacher to teach these virtues.[8]
[8] For the Socratic problem {ei arete didakte} see Grote, "H. G." viii. 599.
Isch. Nor is it possible, you are right so far, to teach such excellences to every single soul in order as simply as a man might number off his fingers.
Soc. Pray, then, what sort of people have the privilege?[9] Should you mind pointing them out to me with some distinctness?
[9] Lit. "what kind of people can be taught them? By all means signify the sort to me distinctly."
Ishc. Well, in the first place, you would have some difficulty in making intemperate people diligent--I speak of intemperance with regard to wine, for drunkenness creates forgetfulness of everything which needs to be done.
Soc. And are persons devoid of self-control in this respect the only people incapable of diligence and carefulness? or are there others in like case?
Isch. Certainly, people who are intemperate with regard to sleep, seeing that the sluggard with his eyes shut cannot do himself or see that others do what is right.
Soc. What then?[10] Are we to regard these as the only people incapable of being taught this virtue of carefulness? or are there others in a like condition?
[10] Or, "What then--is the list exhausted? Are we to suppose that these are the sole people . . ."
Isch. Surely we must include the slave to amorous affection.[11] Your woeful lover[12] is incapable of being taught attention to anything beyond one single object.[13] No light task, I take it, to discover any hope or occupation sweeter to him than that which now employs him, his care for his beloved, nor, when the call for action comes,[14] will it be easy to invent worse punishment than that