The Economist [33]
make requital to the author of it, nor hesitate to visit on the heads of those neglectful of their duty a just recompense." (The language is poetical.)
[24] See Aristot. "Oecon." i. 6; Aesch. "Pers." 165; Cato ap. Plin. "H. N." xviii. 5. Cic. ap. Colum. iv. 18; ib. vi. 21; La Fontaine, "L'Oeil du Maitre."
[25] Or, "so, too, in general it seems to me 'the master's eye' is aptest to elicit energy to issue beautiful and good."
XIII
But now (I ventured), suppose you have presented strongly to the mind of some one[1] the need of carefulness to execute your wishes, is a person so qualified to be regarded as fit at once to be your bailiff? or is there aught else which he must learn in order to play the part of an efficient bailiff?
[1] Breit. cf. "Pol. Lac." xv. 8. Holden cf. Plat. "Rep." 600 C.
Most certainly there is (he answered): it still remains for him to learn particulars--to know, that is, what things he has to do, and when and how to do them; or else, if ignorant of these details, the profit of this bailiff in the abstract may prove no greater than the doctor's who pays a most precise attention to a sick man, visiting him late and early, but what will serve to ease his patient's pains[2] he knows not.
[2] Lit. "what it is to the advantage of his patient to do, is beyond his ken."
Soc. But suppose him to have learnt the whole routine of business, will he need aught else, or have we found at last your bailiff absolute?[3]
[3] Cf. Plat. "Rep." 566 D. Or, "the perfect and consummate type of bailiff."
Isch. He must learn at any rate, I think, to rule his fellow-workmen.
What! (I exclaimed): you mean to say you educate your bailiffs to that extent? Actually you make them capable of rule?
At any rate I try to do so (he replied).
And how, in Heaven's name (I asked), do you contrive to educate another in the skill to govern human beings?
Isch. I have a very simple system, Socrates; so simple, I daresay, you will simply laugh at me.
Soc. The matter, I protest, is hardly one for laughter. The man who can make another capable of rule, clearly can teach him how to play the master; and if can make him play the master, he can make him what is grander still, a kingly being.[4] Once more, therefore, I protest: A man possessed of such creative power is worthy, not of ridicule, far from it, but of the highest praise.
[4] i.e. {arkhikos} includes (1) {despotikos}, i.e. an arbitrary head of any sort, from the master of one's own family to the {turannos kai despotes} (Plat. "Laws," 859 A), despotic lord or owner; (2) {basilikos}, the king or monarch gifted with regal qualities.
Thus, then, I reason,[5] Socrates (he answered): The lower animals are taught obedience by two methods chiefly, partly through being punished when they make attempts to disobey, partly by experiencing some kindness when they cheerfully submit. This is the principle at any rate adopted in the breaking of young horses. The animal obeys its trainer, and something sweet is sure to follow; or it disobeys, and in place of something sweet it finds a peck of trouble; and so on, until it comes at last to yield obedience to the trainer's every wish. Or to take another instance: Young dogs,[6] however far inferior to man in thought and language,[7] can still be taught to run on errands and turn somersaults,[8] and do a host of other clever things, precisely on this same principle of training. Every time the animal obeys it gets something or other which it wanted, and every time it misbehaves it gets a whipping. But when it comes to human beings: in man you have a creature still more open to persuasion through appeals to reason;[9] only make it plain to him "it is his interest to obey." Or if they happen to be slaves,[10] the more ignoble training of wild animals tamed to the lure will serve to teach obedience. Only gratify their bellies in the matter of appetite, and you will succeed in winning much from them.[11] But ambitious, emulous natures feel the spur of praise,[12] since some
[24] See Aristot. "Oecon." i. 6; Aesch. "Pers." 165; Cato ap. Plin. "H. N." xviii. 5. Cic. ap. Colum. iv. 18; ib. vi. 21; La Fontaine, "L'Oeil du Maitre."
[25] Or, "so, too, in general it seems to me 'the master's eye' is aptest to elicit energy to issue beautiful and good."
XIII
But now (I ventured), suppose you have presented strongly to the mind of some one[1] the need of carefulness to execute your wishes, is a person so qualified to be regarded as fit at once to be your bailiff? or is there aught else which he must learn in order to play the part of an efficient bailiff?
[1] Breit. cf. "Pol. Lac." xv. 8. Holden cf. Plat. "Rep." 600 C.
Most certainly there is (he answered): it still remains for him to learn particulars--to know, that is, what things he has to do, and when and how to do them; or else, if ignorant of these details, the profit of this bailiff in the abstract may prove no greater than the doctor's who pays a most precise attention to a sick man, visiting him late and early, but what will serve to ease his patient's pains[2] he knows not.
[2] Lit. "what it is to the advantage of his patient to do, is beyond his ken."
Soc. But suppose him to have learnt the whole routine of business, will he need aught else, or have we found at last your bailiff absolute?[3]
[3] Cf. Plat. "Rep." 566 D. Or, "the perfect and consummate type of bailiff."
Isch. He must learn at any rate, I think, to rule his fellow-workmen.
What! (I exclaimed): you mean to say you educate your bailiffs to that extent? Actually you make them capable of rule?
At any rate I try to do so (he replied).
And how, in Heaven's name (I asked), do you contrive to educate another in the skill to govern human beings?
Isch. I have a very simple system, Socrates; so simple, I daresay, you will simply laugh at me.
Soc. The matter, I protest, is hardly one for laughter. The man who can make another capable of rule, clearly can teach him how to play the master; and if can make him play the master, he can make him what is grander still, a kingly being.[4] Once more, therefore, I protest: A man possessed of such creative power is worthy, not of ridicule, far from it, but of the highest praise.
[4] i.e. {arkhikos} includes (1) {despotikos}, i.e. an arbitrary head of any sort, from the master of one's own family to the {turannos kai despotes} (Plat. "Laws," 859 A), despotic lord or owner; (2) {basilikos}, the king or monarch gifted with regal qualities.
Thus, then, I reason,[5] Socrates (he answered): The lower animals are taught obedience by two methods chiefly, partly through being punished when they make attempts to disobey, partly by experiencing some kindness when they cheerfully submit. This is the principle at any rate adopted in the breaking of young horses. The animal obeys its trainer, and something sweet is sure to follow; or it disobeys, and in place of something sweet it finds a peck of trouble; and so on, until it comes at last to yield obedience to the trainer's every wish. Or to take another instance: Young dogs,[6] however far inferior to man in thought and language,[7] can still be taught to run on errands and turn somersaults,[8] and do a host of other clever things, precisely on this same principle of training. Every time the animal obeys it gets something or other which it wanted, and every time it misbehaves it gets a whipping. But when it comes to human beings: in man you have a creature still more open to persuasion through appeals to reason;[9] only make it plain to him "it is his interest to obey." Or if they happen to be slaves,[10] the more ignoble training of wild animals tamed to the lure will serve to teach obedience. Only gratify their bellies in the matter of appetite, and you will succeed in winning much from them.[11] But ambitious, emulous natures feel the spur of praise,[12] since some