The Eleventh Day_ The History and Legacy of 9_11 - Anthony Summers [300]
37 OBL picked: CR, 235;
38 5’7”: ibid., 231;
39 martyr: ibid., 234;
40 visa easy/Express: Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 32–, 111–, CR, 235, “teater”/“Wasantwn”: Non-immigrant Visa Application of Wail al-Shehri, Joel Mowbray, “Visas for Terrorists,” National Review, archived at www.webcitation.org;
41 “did not think”: Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 125, MFR 04016462, 12/5/03, CF;
42 sky marshals: CR, 236;
43 butcher/“to muddy”/told Dubai: KSM SUBST.
44 travel pairs/“businessman”/tourists/unsatisfactory: Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 29–, Janice Kephart, “The Complete Immigration Story of 9/11 Hijacker Satam al Suqami,” 9/10, www.cis.org. The authors refer here to documentation that was inadequate on its face, but passed muster at Immigration or Customs control. Four of the muscle hijackers, meanwhile, had markers in their passports later understood to have been signs of tampering associated with al Qaeda (Staff Report, 9/11 Terrorist Travel, 29, 33, 34).
45 prior arrangement: KSM SUBST;
46 flew DC/NY: Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 29–;
47 Atta/Hazmi/money: CR, 237;
48 videos/“We left”: Guardian (U.K.), 4/16/02, Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, NY: Columbia Univ. Press, 2006, 133, CR 235, 525n104. The first hijacker videotape was released in April 2002 (Guardian [U.K.], 4/16/02).
49 Massoud/“If President Bush”: Roy Gutman, How We Missed the Story, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2008, 246–; Steve Coll, “Ahmad Shah Massoud Links with CIA,” 2/23/04, www.rawa.org, WP, 1/19 & 20/02;
50 “gained limited”: Defense Intelligence Agency, cable, “IIR [redacted]/The Assassination of Massoud Related to 11 September 2001 Attack,” 11/21/01, as released to the National Security Archive, www.gwu.edu, Schroen, 95–;
51 “was sending”: Tenet, 156;
52 Cairo/“We knew”: NYT, 6/4/02;
53 “something big was coming”: MFR 03009296, 11/3/03, MFR 04017179, 10/3/03;
54 Freeh/Ashcroft/denied: Newsweek, 5/27/02;
55 briefing documents/“public profile”: Staff Statement 10, CO, Shenon, 151–. The exception is the PDB of August 6, which is covered later in this chapter;
56 triumphalist speeches: Bergen, OBL I Know, 293–, Orange County Weekly, 9/7/02;
57 “They send”: The Australian, 12/21/07, The Age (Melbourne), 12/21/07;
58 “All the people”: Guardian (U.K.), 11/28/02;
59 Mihdhar/“I will make”: Bamford, Shadow Factory, 64;
60 “the success”: CR, 251;
61 “It’s time”: Fouda & Fielding, 166.
62 Taliban asked: CR, 251. The Taliban appear to have been concerned not only about U.S. reprisals, but also as to what bin Laden should target. Taliban leader Mullah Omar reportedly favored attacking Jews—not necessarily the United States. Emails found later on the terrorist computer obtained by Wall Street Journal reporter Cullison show there was also dissension amongst the terrorists as to whether to give bin Laden full support at this time. “Going on,” one writer complained, “is like fighting ghosts and windmills” (CR, 250–, WSJ, 7/2/02).
63 MBC reporter/“some news”/“coffin”: In the Footsteps of Bin Laden, 8/23/06, www.cnn.com, Bergen, OBL I Know, 284–. According to CIA reporting of KSM’s interrogations, KSM