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By Root 1535 0

and Atef “were concerned about this lack of discretion and urged bin Laden not to make additional comments about the plot.” It seems odd then that Atef, normally described as having been professional, should have taken part in the MBC interview. He may have hoped at least to blur the truth by referring to the coming attacks as targeting “American and Israeli interests”—thus avoiding giving away the fact that the attack would be on U.S. territory. If that was his intention, the deception was successful—many in the U.S. had the impression that the attack would take place overseas (“were concerned”: KSM SUBST, Atef: CR, refs.; successful: e.g. CR, 256–).

64 impatient/Cole: KSM SUBST, e.g. Mehnaz Sahibzada, “The Symbolism of the Number 7 in Islamic Culture and Rituals,” www.wadsworth.com;

65 dreams: e.g., Fouda & Fielding, 109, Lacey, Inside the Kingdom, 21, WP, 9/11/02;

66 OBL bombarded/Sharon visit/Arafat not invited: KSM SUBST, NYT, 6/20/01;

67 “big gift”: Bergen, OBL I Know, 284–.

68 “like Captain Ahab”: Richard Clarke, 234;

69 “Clarke was driving”: Conclusions from Review of NSC papers, “Misc. 9/11 Commission Staff Notes About Drafting Final Report,” 16095055, CF;

70 “When these attacks”: CR, 256;

71 rated a seven: Tenet, 145–;

72 was “recruiting”/high alert: CR, 256–;

73 “very, very”/Clarke duly: CR, 257, Bamford, Shadow Factory, 55;

74 July 10 assessment/“There will”/“put his elbows”: Tenet, 150–.

75 “felt”/“The decision”/“Adults”: Bob Woodward, State of Denial, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2006, 49–. It seems clear from this passage—in his 2006 book, State of Denial—that he interviewed Cofer Black. Also, perhaps, former CIA director Tenet. While Woodward reported that Tenet left the meeting “feeling frustrated,” Tenet stated in his memoir the following year that Black and the head of the Agency’s bin Laden unit departed feeling that “at last … we had gotten the full attention of the administration.” Within two days, a congressional report shows, Tenet went to the Capitol to give a similar briefing to U.S. senators. Only a handful turned up. It was a mystery to him, Tenet wrote, why the 9/11 Commission Report failed to mention the July 10 meeting with Rice—he had told the commissioners about the encounter in closed testimony. It was established that Tenet had indeed told the Commission of the meeting. As others have noted, the Commission’s executive director, Philip Zelikow, was closer to Rice and other Bush appointees than was healthy for a man heading a supposedly even-handed investigation—he had even coauthored a book with Rice. According to 9/11 Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste, Tenet thought Rice “understood the level of urgency he was communicating.”

“It is shocking,” Peter Rundlet, a former Commission counsel, has written, “that the administration failed to heed such an overwhelming alert from the two officials in the best position to know. Many, many questions need to be asked and answered about this revelation” (meeting: Woodward, State of Denial, 50–, Tenet, 151–; congressional report: Report, “Tora Bora Revisited: How We Failed to Get Bin Laden and Why It Matters Today,” Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 111th Cong., 1st Sess., U.S. Govt. Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 11/30/09, 4; indeed given: WP, 10/3/06; Zelikow: e.g., Shenon, 40–, 65–, 106–, Woodward, State of Denial, 52; understood: McClatchy Newspapers, 10/2/06; Rundlet: Peter Rundlet, “Bush Officials May Have Covered Up Rice-Tenet Meeting from 9/11 Commission,” http://thinkprogress.org).

76 Black/Scheuer/UBL unit head resignations: MFR 03009296, 9/3/03, Shenon, 395, CR, 259–;

77 “The purpose”/Williams concerns/​Zubaydah/​connected/​Hanjour/​Williams recommended: Phoenix, Squad 16 to Counterterrorism, 7/10/01, www.justice.gov, FBI IG, Statement of Eleanor Hill re “The FBI’s Handling of the Phoenix Electronic Communication and Investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui Prior to Sept. 11, 2001,” 9/24/02 [as updated 10/17/02]. The suspicious activity on the America West flight, which may have been reconnaissance for the 9/11 operation,