The Federalist Papers - Alexander Hamilton [22]
NO. 43: THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED 268
Miscellaneous powers—Copyrights and patents—The federal city—Punishment of treason—Admission of new States—Government of territories and control of public property—Guarantee to every State of a republican form of government—Protection of States against invasion and against domestic violence—Assumption of payment of outstanding debts—Amendments to the Constitution—The establishment of this government on the adherence of nine States—Objection that this is a violation of the Confederation—Relations between ratifying States and those which refuse to ratify.
NO. 44: RESTRICTIONS ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE SEVERAL STATES 277
Forbidding the establishment of treaties and alliances between the States, the issue of letters of marque, the coinage of money, the issue of bills of credit, the establishment of any legal tender other than gold and silver, the passage of bills of attainder, the passage of ex-post-facto laws, the passage of laws impairing contracts, the establishment of titles of nobility, and the imposition of duties on exports and imports—The power to make all laws necessary and proper to carry the preceding powers into execution—Necessity of such a power—Prohibition of the exercise of any powers not expressly delegated—Positive enumeration of general powers delegated—Negative enumeration by specification of reserved powers and by silence—Remedy for an abuse of this general power—The supremacy of the Constitution, the constitutional laws, and treaties—Oath of State and federal officers to support Constitution—No part of the powers delegated unnecessary or improper.
NO. 45: THE ALLEGED DANGER FROM THE POWERS OF THE UNION TO THE STATE GOVERNMENTS CONSIDERED 285
The new Constitution not dangerous to the State governments, because: the tendency in confederacies is to weaken the central power; the State governments will have more influence among the people; the State governments are essential parts of the federal government; the officers of the United States are less numerous than those of the States; the reserved powers are relatively greater than those delegated; the proposed change consists less in giving new than in strengthening old powers.
NO. 46: THE INFLUENCE OF THE STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS COMPARED 290
Federal and State governments only different agents of the same constituents—The first attachment of the people will be to the State governments—Reasons for this—Popularity will come to the federal government only if it is better administered—Reasons for this—Objection on score of federal military power answered—Concluding remarks on the proposition that the powers of the Union will be dangerous to the State governments.
NO. 47: THE PARTICULAR STRUCTURE OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER AMONG ITS DIFFERENT PARTS 297
The maxim that there should be separate and distinct departments considered—This maxim true—The new Constitution does not violate it—The views of Montesquieu—Departments have partial control over each other—The provisions of the various State constitutions on this point examined.
NO. 48: THESE DEPARTMENTS SHOULD NOT BE SO FAR SEPARATED AS TO HAVE NO CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL OVER EACH OTHER 305
Powers of one department, it is conceded, should not be exercised by another—One department should not have an overruling influence over another—Security against the invasion of one department by another considered—Insufficiency of parchment barriers—The tendency of the legislature to absorb the other departments—Reasons for this—Examples of Virginia and Pennsylvania—An instance of executive encroachment explained.
NO. 49: METHOD OF GUARDING AGAINST THE ENCROACHMENTS OF ANY ONE DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT BY APPEALING TO THE PEOPLE THROUGH A CONVENTION 310
Jefferson’s plan for Virginia examined—Propriety of a well-defined mode of appealing to the people—A sufficient remedy—Very dangerous and useless if too frequently applied—Need for veneration