The Federalist Papers - Alexander Hamilton [23]
NO. 50: PERIODICAL APPEALS TO THE PEOPLE CONSIDERED 314
The merits and disadvantages of short and long intervals—Example of Pennsylvania.
NO. 51: THE STRUCTURE OF THE GOVERNMENT MUST FURNISH THE PROPER CHECKS AND BALANCES BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS 317
Modes of obtaining these mutual checks and balances through interior structure of government—Ambition to counteract ambition—Advantages of the federal government in securing the rights of the people—Division of the delegated powers—Multiplicity of interests among the people in an extended republic.
NO. 52: THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 322
Electors—The qualifications of the members—The term of office—Biennial elections—Value of frequent elections—Terms of service in other governments—In England, Ireland, and in the American colonies—Biennial elections not dangerous—Reasons for this drawn from the nature and position of Congress.
NO. 53: THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED 327
Objection that when annual elections end tyranny begins answered—Biennial elections necessary and useful—Objections to unduly short terms—Biennial elections useful and safe.
NO. 54: THE APPORTIONMENT OF MEMBERS AMONG THE STATES 333
Numbers the proper standard for representation—Slave representation—Objection that slaves do not enter into local representation considered—The right of representation of property as well as persons—Votes in Congress should be proportioned to the wealth of the States—No inducement for falsifying the census, as it is the basis of taxation as well as representation.
NO. 55: THE TOTAL NUMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 338
Importance attached to this subject—Difficulty of determining the proper number—Small States require smaller ratios—Limited powers of Congress do not demand a numerous representation—Various objections considered and answered—Sources of danger considered.
NO. 56: THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED 343
Objection that Congress will be too small to know the interests and wishes of its constituents considered—The representative ought to know the interests of his constituents—Objects of federal legislation—A few representatives will be sufficient—Taxation—Militia—The experience of Great Britain.
NO. 57: THE ALLEGED TENDENCY OF THE NEW PLAN TO ELEVATE THE FEW AT THE EXPENSE OF THE MANY CONSIDERED IN CONNECTION WITH REPRESENTATION 348
This objection, in principle, strikes at the root of representative government—Members elected by and taken from all classes—Securities to ensure fidelity of members enumerated—Provisions for electing members, and their qualifications, like those of State officers—The relative numbers of the constituencies no reason for approval of State and disapproval of federal system—The doctrine neither reasonable nor admissible—It is not sustained by facts—Examples from House of Commons and from the States.
NO. 58: OBJECTION THAT THE NUMBER OF MEMBERS WILL NOT BE AUGMENTED AS THE PROGRESS OF POPULATION DEMANDS, CONSIDERED 354
The State constitutions compared on this point with the one proposed—The practice of the State governments—The organization of Congress will induce watchfulness—The large States will control the small—Objection that the Senate will prevent augmentation answered—The constitutional resource of refusing supplies by the House—Reasons against a numerous House—Objection to a majority being a quorum of which a majority can enact laws, considered.
NO. 59: CONCERNING THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO REGULATE THE ELECTION OF MEMBERS 359
Every government must have the means of self-preservation—Different depositaries of this power considered—Exact character and extent of this power—If this power not given, the federal government will be at the mercy of the State governments—The right of self-preservation in the State governments unimpaired—Objection that the power of the States in the election of senators is equally dangerous, considered—Reasons for this retention of power