The Federalist Papers - Alexander Hamilton [24]
NO. 60: THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED 364
Objection that by this power Congress may promote the election of a favorite class and exclude others, considered—Reasons for dismissing this objection enumerated.
NO. 61: THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED 370
Objection that there should be a provision that all elections should be held within the counties where the electors live—Such a provision harmless and offers no security—This provision compared with those of State constitutions—The probability that the power of Congress to fix a uniform day for elections will be very important—The want of any provision in the Constitution fixing such a day considered—Concluding remarks on the general subject.
NO. 62: THE SENATE 374
Qualifications of senators—Appointment of senators by State legislatures—Equality of representation in Senate—Mixed character of federal government requires a mixed representation—Equal representation in Senate a recognition of sovereignty in the States—The number of senators and the term for which they are elected—Need of such an upper house as a security against improper legislation, against the infirmity of faction, against ignorant legislation, against mutability in its councils from frequent changes of members—Dangers of such mutability enumerated.
NO. 63: THE SENATE CONTINUED 380
Prevents a want of a due sense of national character, of a due responsibility, and of a defense against temporary errors and delusions—History shows no long-lived republic without a Senate—Difference between the ancient republics and the United States—Athens, Carthage, Sparta, Rome, Crete—Objection that the Senate will acquire a dangerous pre-eminence considered—Such a result impossible—Senate of Maryland—British Parliament—Sparta, Rome, Carthage—The controlling influence of the House of Representatives.
NO. 64: THE POWERS OF THE SENATE 388
The treaty-making power—Importance of this power—Properly vested in the Senate—A popular body not fit for this power—Reasons—Objections to this power in the Senate considered, and reasons for their rejection enumerated—The responsibility of senators.
NO. 65: THE POWERS OF THE SENATE CONTINUED 394
The appointment of public officers—The authority to sit as a court in the trial of impeachments—Difficulty of forming such a court—The Senate most fit for such a trust—The plan of delegating this authority to the Supreme Court considered and rejected—The propriety of uniting the Supreme Court in this power with the Senate considered and denied—The propriety of giving this authority to other persons disconnected with any department of the government considered and denied—Even if this power in the Senate is not desirable the Constitution should not be rejected.
NO. 66: OBJECTIONS TO THE POWER OF THE SENATE TO SIT AS A COURT FOR IMPEACHMENTS FURTHER CONSIDERED 399
Objection that it unites legislative and judicial functions—This same provision in constitution of New York which opponents admire—That it unduly accumulates power in the Senate, and tends to the establishment of an aristocracy—That the Senate will judge too leniently officers for whose confirmation it has voted—That the senators may be called upon to try themselves for a corrupt use of the treaty-making power.
NO. 67: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 405
Misrepresentations on this point considered and answered—President more like governor of New York than king of Great Britain—Indignation at opponents’ tactics—Power of filling vacancies in Senate resides with state governors, not President.
NO. 68: THE MODE OF ELECTING THE PRESIDENT 410
The only part of the Constitution not condemned by its opponents—It is well guarded—Desirable to have the sense of the people in the choice—Desirable that the choice should be made by competent persons, as in the Electoral College: to avoid tumult and disorder; to avoid intrigue and corruption; to maintain the President independent of all