The Federalist Papers - Alexander Hamilton [25]
NO. 69: THE REAL CHARACTER OF THE EXECUTIVE 414
A single person—Compared with the king of Great Britain and the governor of New York—Elected for four years, and is re-eligible—Further comparison with the same executives—Liable to impeachment, removal from office, and punishment by civil law—Compared again as above, and also with governors of Maryland and Delaware—Veto power—Compared again as above, and also with governor of Massachusetts—Commander-in-chief of militia in federal service—Compared again as above—Commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States—Compared again as above, and also with governors of New Hampshire and Massachusetts—Pardoning power—Compared as above—Treaty-making power—Compared as above—General review and comparison of executive powers.
NO. 70: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT FURTHER CONSIDERED 421
A vigorous Executive consistent with republican government—What constitutes a proper Executive—Unity—Reasons for this—Vesting executive authority in two or more magistrates—Restraining the Executive by a council—Objections to plurality and control by council enumerated.
NO. 71: THE DURATION IN OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE 429
It affects his firmness in action—More interest in what is permanent—The Executive should not be subservient to popular impulses or to those of the legislature—Independence of departments of government necessary—Shortness of term will lessen independence—The proposed term of four years considered.
NO. 72: THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED, AND RE-ELIGIBILITY OF THE EXECUTIVE CONSIDERED 434
Duration in office affects stability of administration—Heads of department dependent on Executive and will change with him—Re-eligibility of Executive—The opposition to it considered—A limit of a single term would diminish inducements to good behavior, increase temptations to misconduct, prevent experience in the office, deprive the country in emergencies of the services of the best men, and act as a constitutional barrier to stability of administration—The supposed advantages of a single term considered—The people should not be prevented from choosing men of experience.
NO. 73: THE PROVISION FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE, AND THE VETO POWER 439
Without suitable provision the Executive will beat the mercy of the legislature, and the independence of the Executive should not be impaired—The veto power—Reasons for and against enumerated and considered—The veto power not absolute—It already exists in New York and Massachusetts.
NO. 74: THE COMMAND OF THE MILITARY AND NAVAL FORCES, AND THE PARDONING POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE 445
The President as commander-in-chief—May require written opinions of executive department heads—Pardoning power lodged responsibly in one man—Even in relation to crime of treason.
NO. 75: THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE 448
One of the best features of the Constitution—Objection that it combines the executive and legislative departments considered—It is a proper combination—Reasons for this—House of Representatives cannot properly be admitted—Objection to requiring only two thirds of senators present.
NO. 76: THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE 453
This is an excellent feature—This power cannot be exercised by the people at large—It will cause a livelier sense of duty in the Executive—Objection to its being entrusted to the President alone—He may be overruled by Senate—Concurrence of Senate a check on favoritism—Objection that the President may thus control Senate considered—Whole body of Senate cannot be corrupted—Protection of Constitution.
NO. 77: THE APPOINTING POWER CONTINUED AND OTHER POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE CONSIDERED 458
The concurrence of the Senate necessary to displace as well as to appoint—Objections as to undue control of the Senate by the President, or the reverse, considered—Compared with system of appointment in New York—Appointing power should be delegated to a council or shared