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By Root 913 0

Hammami, known as Abu Mansoor “Al-Amriki,” one of Shabaab’s more notorious online recruiters, is a US citizen born in small-town Alabama). With its suppression of women, glorification of martyrdom, and visions of a global caliphate, Shabaab embraces the kind of Islam the war on terror thrives on. In the areas under its control, the group has banned sports, music, and even bras; those who transgress the group’s strict Salafi interpretation of sharia law face amputation and medieval executions (girls as young as thirteen have been stoned to death for the “crime” of adultery).2 Shabaab’s radicalism was new to Somalis, who had traditionally practiced a moderate, Sufi-influenced variety of Islam. Up until a generation ago, it was common for women to uncover their heads; these days, the Arab style of dress, with its accompanying headscarf, is virtually ubiquitous.

In a world dominated by the discourse of the war on terror, various policy analysts, journalists, and politicians pushing particular agendas inevitably began to speculate about pirate cash ending up in the hands of terrorists. One of the early claims came from the London-based publication Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, which reported that Shabaab had provided the pirates with funds, bases, and “specialist weapons” in exchange for a share of the ransoms as well as pirate training in “naval tactics.”3 The image of turbaned Islamists instructing pirates in sharpshooting in return for sailing lessons would be laughable if it did not have such serious implications for the safety of hostages; a Shabaab-piracy connection would effectively prevent the paying of ransoms, since in most Western countries it is illegal under any circumstances to transfer funds to a designated terrorist organization.

History, at least, seems to be against those who would claim an Islamist-pirate conspiracy. In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union began pushing north, reaching Harardheere in August. Dubbing piracy un-Islamic, or haram, ICU militias shut down operations in Harardheere, forcing many pirates into Puntland (as mentioned in Chapter 2, the ICU clamp-down in Harardheere partly accounted for the rise of Eyl as Somalia’s piracy capital). Despite the potential loss of revenue, evincing such an attitude—at least publicly—was necessary for the ICU to maintain the legitimacy of its fundamentalist ideology. It was able to afford its pious airs; the group reportedly receives substantial funding from affluent supporters in Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states.

During my months in Puntland, I questioned every pirate I met about Islamist ties, and received the same vehement denials from every one. Nonetheless, some indications of a relationship between Al-Shabaab and the pirates had emerged by late 2009, or so said my source in the Somali diplomatic community. On October 2, the Spanish tuna boat Alakrana was seized by one of Afweyne’s attack groups and brought to Harardheere (the thirty-six hostages were released seven weeks later for a reported ransom of $4.5 million). Before arriving in Harardheere, however, the pirates stopped at the Shabaab-controlled port of Baraawe, where two hijackers headed for shore in a small skiff. They had hardly left the ship before a Spanish navy helicopter intercepted and arrested them.

“They were supposed to meet the Shabaab leaders in Baraawe and bring them to Harardheere,” my source explained. “As it turned out, the leaders had to make the trip by road.” The incident, he argued, was “ultimate evidence” of a connection between Shabaab and the Harardheere pirates, a relationship that he said had been brokered by Afweyne himself. “Shabaab could be receiving anywhere from 5 per cent to 60 per cent of the ransom,” my source said. “And according to my information, it’s much more than a gentleman’s agreement for money. Al-Shabaab itself seems to be training for acts of piracy—becoming, in effect, ‘sea Mujahedeen.’ ”

Nevertheless, there was still no evidence, fourteen months later, that any Islamist group had launched a “piracy division.” But this may change; in