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By Root 914 0

a repeat of the 2006 ICU clamp-down, Hizbul Islam—the then second most influential Islamist group in Somalia, after Shabaab—invaded Harardheere in May 2010, chasing many of the resident pirates north to the town of Hobyo. Like the ICU, both Hizbul Islam and Shabaab have publicly declared piracy to be haram, but the lure of large sums of money may have spawned a reinterpretation of the scriptures; there are reports that the remaining Harardheere pirates have begun to split their ransoms with both Islamist groups.4 In the cynical words of my diplomat source, “Nothing is haram if it supports the insurgency.”

In Hobyo, conversely, the pirates have decided to fight ’em rather than join ’em. Mohamed Garfjani, a Hobyo pirate strongman believed to have hijacked a half-dozen ships, has built up an organized militia consisting of several hundred men, eighty heavy machine guns, and six technicals (flatbed trucks mounted with light anti-aircraft guns).5 In an effort to stave off the Islamist expansion, Garfjani has placed his muscle in the service of local officials of Galmudug, the semi-autonomous region in which Harardheere and Hobyo are located (the Galmudug administration, it must be said, has never exercised effective control over the towns).

Links between pirates and terrorists undoubtedly exist, but they are isolated and incidental—opportunistic individuals with Islamist ties who happen to dabble in piracy investments on the side. Shabaab, as an organization, does not yet have conclusive systematic links to the pirates, and the pirates have good reason to keep it that way. As one Somalia analyst put it to me: “If I’m a pirate and I’m giving money to Al-Shabaab, I can be pretty sure that some American is going to find out and drop a bomb on my head. It’s simply a very, very bad business decision.”

MYTH #3: SOMALI PIRACY IS RUN BY AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CARTEL.

Many theories have sprung up to explain the astounding success of the Somali pirates in snatching vessels from right under the guns of Western naval armadas, almost all of which seem to rest on the assumption that the Somalis could not possibly be doing it on their own. Security firms, media outlets, and law enforcement agencies have all alleged the existence of a vast and sophisticated international crime network providing funding, equipment, and intelligence to their local Somali minions—conjuring the image of a sinister Bond film villain pushing buttons on a giant maritime navigation display.

One of the strongest and most outlandish claims came in October 2009, when Interpol announced that Somali piracy was controlled by “transnational crime syndicates.” “It is organized crime,” Jean-Michel Louboutin, executive director of police services at Interpol, bluntly told the Agence France-Presse (when I attempted to contact Mr. Louboutin to clarify his statement, a public relations rep informed me, without elaborating, that he had been misquoted).6

I asked Toby Stephens, a London-based crisis response lawyer, about these claims. The principal function of Stephens’s firm is to “convince” a hijacked ship’s various insurers to put up the ransom money, and his job had taken him almost as far as the negotiating room during the ransom bargaining process. “We’ve been involved with various security services in tracing the pirates’ phone calls, as well as their assets,” said Stephens. “There have been definite instances of calls coming to telephones in London. The criminal network certainly extends beyond Somalia, but my perception is that it is not nearly as organized as people think,” he continued. “I think the pirates are a disorganized bunch, but they do have contacts—friends, family, whoever it may be—in places around the globe. And they draw on those, but it’s not a mafia-style organized crime network.”

On the ground, there is little to back up the tales of international conspiracy. Pirates operate in relatively small, decentralized groups of twenty to fifty—essentially, relatives and friends who come together for the purpose of a mission, then disperse once the task