The Scottish Philosophy [2]
Philosophy is by a Frenchman, and has not been translated into English. We look on "Philosophic Ecossaise," the volume in which M. Cousin treats of the Scottish school, as containing upon the whole the most faultless of all his historical disquisitions. In his other volumes he scarcely does justice to Locke, whom he always judges from the evil consequences which have flowed from his philosophy on the continent, and he is not able to wrestle successfully with the powerful logical intellect of Kant; but he has a thorough appreciation of the excellencies of the Scottish metaphysicians, and, when he finds fault, his criticisms are always worthy of being considered. But it could not be expected of a foreigner, that he should thoroughly comprehend the state of Scotland when its peculiar philosophy arose, nor be able to estimate its relation to the national character; and the account given by M. Cousin is fragmentary, and critical rather than expository.
The Scottish Philosophy possesses a unity, not only in the circumstance that its expounders have been Scotchmen, but also and more specially in its method, its doctrines, and its spirit. It is distinguished by very marked and decided features, which we may represent as determined by the bones rather than the flesh or muscles.
1. It proceeds on the method of observation, professedly and really. In this respect it is different from nearly all the philosophies which went before, from many of those which were contemporary, and from some of those which still linger among us. The method pursued in Eastern countries, in ancient Greece and Rome, in the scholastic times, and in the earlier ages of modern European speculation, had not been that of induction, either avowedly or truly. No doubt, speculators have been obliged in all ages and countries to make some use of facts, in the investigation of both mind and matter. But in the earlier theosophies, physiologies, and philosophies, they looked at the phenomena of nature merely as furnishing a starting- point to their systems, or a corroboration of them; and their inquiries were conducted in the dogmatic, or deductive, or analytic manner, explaining phenomena by assumed principles, or bringing facts to support theories, or resolving the complexities of the universe by refined mental distinctions. This spirit had been banished from physical science, first, by the great realistic awakening of the sixteenth century; then by the profound wisdom and far- sighted sagacity of Bacon; and, finally, by the discoveries of Newton and the establishment of the Royal Society of London. But it lingered for some ages longer in material science, from which it has not even yet been finally expelled. Bacon had declared, that his method was applicable to all other sciences as well as to the investigation of the material universe. "Does any one doubt (rather than object)," says he, "whether we speak merely of natural philosophy or of other sciences also, such as logics, ethics, politics, as about to be perfected by our method?" "We certainly," he replies, "understand all these things which have been referred to; and like as the vulgar logic, which regulates things by the syllogism, pertains not to the natural but all sciences, so ours, which proceeds by induction, embraces them all. For thus we would form a history and tables concerning anger, fear, modesty, and the like, as also examples of civil affairs, not omitting the mental emotions of memory, composition, division, judgment, and the rest, just as we form such of heat and cold, of light, vegetation, and such like." Sir Isaac Newton had said in his Optics: "And if natural philosophy in all its parts, by pursuing this method, shall at length be perfected, the bounds of moral philosophy will also be enlarged." But the employment of the method of induction in the study of the human mind was for ages slow, wavering, and uncertain. It has been asserted, that Descartes proceeded on the method of induction; but the statement has been made by metaphysicians who have never correctly apprehended the
The Scottish Philosophy possesses a unity, not only in the circumstance that its expounders have been Scotchmen, but also and more specially in its method, its doctrines, and its spirit. It is distinguished by very marked and decided features, which we may represent as determined by the bones rather than the flesh or muscles.
1. It proceeds on the method of observation, professedly and really. In this respect it is different from nearly all the philosophies which went before, from many of those which were contemporary, and from some of those which still linger among us. The method pursued in Eastern countries, in ancient Greece and Rome, in the scholastic times, and in the earlier ages of modern European speculation, had not been that of induction, either avowedly or truly. No doubt, speculators have been obliged in all ages and countries to make some use of facts, in the investigation of both mind and matter. But in the earlier theosophies, physiologies, and philosophies, they looked at the phenomena of nature merely as furnishing a starting- point to their systems, or a corroboration of them; and their inquiries were conducted in the dogmatic, or deductive, or analytic manner, explaining phenomena by assumed principles, or bringing facts to support theories, or resolving the complexities of the universe by refined mental distinctions. This spirit had been banished from physical science, first, by the great realistic awakening of the sixteenth century; then by the profound wisdom and far- sighted sagacity of Bacon; and, finally, by the discoveries of Newton and the establishment of the Royal Society of London. But it lingered for some ages longer in material science, from which it has not even yet been finally expelled. Bacon had declared, that his method was applicable to all other sciences as well as to the investigation of the material universe. "Does any one doubt (rather than object)," says he, "whether we speak merely of natural philosophy or of other sciences also, such as logics, ethics, politics, as about to be perfected by our method?" "We certainly," he replies, "understand all these things which have been referred to; and like as the vulgar logic, which regulates things by the syllogism, pertains not to the natural but all sciences, so ours, which proceeds by induction, embraces them all. For thus we would form a history and tables concerning anger, fear, modesty, and the like, as also examples of civil affairs, not omitting the mental emotions of memory, composition, division, judgment, and the rest, just as we form such of heat and cold, of light, vegetation, and such like." Sir Isaac Newton had said in his Optics: "And if natural philosophy in all its parts, by pursuing this method, shall at length be perfected, the bounds of moral philosophy will also be enlarged." But the employment of the method of induction in the study of the human mind was for ages slow, wavering, and uncertain. It has been asserted, that Descartes proceeded on the method of induction; but the statement has been made by metaphysicians who have never correctly apprehended the