The Scottish Philosophy [230]
a belief in the existence of a sentient organ. To have a belief in the existence of the sun is something more than merely to have an idea of the sun. The belief, be it intuitive, or be it derivative, is a different thing from the sensation and the idea, and should have a separate place in every system of psychology.
It is at this place that he develops most fully the principle for which he has received such praise from his son, -- the principle of inseparable association. " In every instance of belief, there is indissoluble association of the ideas," and he defies any one to show that there is any other ingredient. But, surely, there is often belief without any inseparable association: thus I may believe that a friend is dead, though in time past all my associations have been of him as alive. But, even in cases of indissoluble association, the belief is different from the association. One of the grand defects of the whole theory consists in accounting by association of ideas for what is assuredly a different process, for judgment, for judgment proceeding on a knowledge of things. At no other point do we see so clearly the tendency of the whole school to degrade the dignity and undermine the trustworthiness of the human intellect.
By this indissoluble association he can account easily for our belief in causation. " I hear words in the street,--; some one of course is making them, -- . My house is broken and my goods are gone, -- event; a thief has taken them, -- . This is that remarkable case of association in which the association is inseparable." " We cannot think [in the sense of having an idea] of the one without thinking of the other." Once more the essential element is left out; we not only have an idea, we judge, decide, and believe; and when we judge, decide, and believe, that everywhere, at all times, and for ever, an event has and must have a cause, the process seems to me to be justifiable, but to involve an intuitive principle. Mr. John Stuart Mill is only following out the principles advocated by his father, when he holds that there may be worlds {385} in which two and two make five, and in which there may be an effect without a cause. In another subject James Mill has led his son to a point where the father has stopped, while the son has gone on. " In my belief, then, of the existence of an object, there is included the belief that, in such and such circumstances, I should have such and such sensations. Is there any thing more?" "I not only believe that I shall see St. Paul's church-yard, but I believe that I should see it if I were in St. Paul's church- yard this instant." This is on the very verge of the son's definition of body and of mind. We see how needful it is to examine the fundamental assumptions of a philosophy which has culminated in such results, and is undermining our belief in the reality of things.
In Chap. XII. we have a short and feeble account of ratiocination, in which he proceeds on the syllogistic analysis without comprehending the principles involved in it. He takes as his example, " All men are animals. Kings are men. Therefore kings are animals; " and he shows that in all this there is only association, and the belief which is part of it. In the proposition "kings are men," the belief is merely the recognition that the individuals named kings are part of the many of whom men is the common name. "Kings" is associated with "all men," " all men " with " animals; " " kings," therefore, with animals. The account of evidence, in the short chapter which succeeds, is merely a summation of what had gone before, and is exceedingly meagre.
He now turns (Chap. XIV.) to "names requiring particular explanations," and explains, according to his theory of sensations and ideas, such profound subjects as relations, numbers, time, motion, identity. Mr. Bain represents him as here "endeavoring to express the most fundamental fact of consciousness, the necessity of change or transition from one state to another, in order to our being conscious.
It is at this place that he develops most fully the principle for which he has received such praise from his son, -- the principle of inseparable association. " In every instance of belief, there is indissoluble association of the ideas," and he defies any one to show that there is any other ingredient. But, surely, there is often belief without any inseparable association: thus I may believe that a friend is dead, though in time past all my associations have been of him as alive. But, even in cases of indissoluble association, the belief is different from the association. One of the grand defects of the whole theory consists in accounting by association of ideas for what is assuredly a different process, for judgment, for judgment proceeding on a knowledge of things. At no other point do we see so clearly the tendency of the whole school to degrade the dignity and undermine the trustworthiness of the human intellect.
By this indissoluble association he can account easily for our belief in causation. " I hear words in the street,--
In Chap. XII. we have a short and feeble account of ratiocination, in which he proceeds on the syllogistic analysis without comprehending the principles involved in it. He takes as his example, " All men are animals. Kings are men. Therefore kings are animals; " and he shows that in all this there is only association, and the belief which is part of it. In the proposition "kings are men," the belief is merely the recognition that the individuals named kings are part of the many of whom men is the common name. "Kings" is associated with "all men," " all men " with " animals; " " kings," therefore, with animals. The account of evidence, in the short chapter which succeeds, is merely a summation of what had gone before, and is exceedingly meagre.
He now turns (Chap. XIV.) to "names requiring particular explanations," and explains, according to his theory of sensations and ideas, such profound subjects as relations, numbers, time, motion, identity. Mr. Bain represents him as here "endeavoring to express the most fundamental fact of consciousness, the necessity of change or transition from one state to another, in order to our being conscious.