The Scottish Philosophy [231]
He approaches very near to, without exactly touching, the inference, that all consciousness, all sensation, all knowledge, must be of ," as if we could not have a sensation of pain till there is a change into pleasure, or of pleasure till we have also pain. This is to reverse the natural process in which we have first the individuals, and thus and then discover relations between them, -- it may be, many and varied, according to the knowledge we previously have of {386} the individuals. According to Mill, that a feeling of red and a feeling of blue is "different and known to be so, are not two things but one and the same thing;" thus doing away with all relation, in fact with all comparison and judgment, and reasoning as founded on comparison. "Space is a mere abstract term formed by dropping the connotation. Linear extension is the idea of a line, the connotation dropped; that is, the idea of resisting dropped." We ask what is the line? Infinite is the concrete term, here denoting line: drop the connotation, and you have infinity, the abstract." It is a convenient but certainly a most fallacious way of reducing realities to nonentities. Time is "pastness, presentness, and futureness" joined by association; but he can render no account of pastness, presentness, and futureness. The idea of motion and the idea of extension are the same. Identity is merely the name of a certain case of belief. " Reflection (Chap. XV.) is nothing; but consciousness is the having the sensations and ideas:" most people would say it is a knowledge of self, as having an idea, a sensation, or some other mental exercise.
He treats from Chap. XVI.-XXII. of the active powers of the mind, or the powers which excite to action. All throughout, he gains a delusive simplicity, simply by overlooking an element, commonly the main element, in the phenomenon. Desire is the same thing as the idea of a pleasure, " and the number of our desires is the same with that of our pleasurable sensations; the number of our aversions, the same with that of our painful sensations."I hold that desire is something superadded to mere sensation, and indicating a higher capacity, and that we may and ought to desire many things beside mere sensations of pleasure. He then proceeds to show us in the way the Scottish metaphysicians had done, from Hutcheson and Turnbull downwards; how the desire of pleasure gives rise to other impulses, which may by association become ends, and not mere means; such as, wealth, power, dignity, friendship, kindness, family, country, party, mankind. A man looks upon his child as a cause to him of future pains and pleasures, much more certain than any other person; " and thus gathers round it a whole host of associations that constitute parental love. All this I admit will mingle with and strengthen family affection; but in the heart of the affection there is a natural {387} love on the part of parents for their children. In accounting for the love of beauty, he takes advantage of Alison's theory, a theory not favored by those who have discovered mathematical relations in beautiful forms. The following quotation will en able us to understand what he means by motives: "As every pleasure is worth having, -- for otherwise it would not be a pleasure, -- the idea of every pleasure associated with that of an action of ours as the cause is a motive; that is, leads to the action. But every motive does not produce the action. The reason is, the existence of other motives which prevent it. A man is tempted to commit adultery with the wife of his friend: the composition of the motive is obvious. He does not obey the motive. Why? He obeys other motives which are stronger. Though pleasures are associated with the immoral act, pains are associated with it also; the pains of the injured husband, the pains of the injured wife, the moral indignation of man kind, the future reproaches of his own mind. Some men obey the first rather than the second motive. The reason is obvious. In them the association of the act with the pleasure is, from habit, unduly strong:
He treats from Chap. XVI.-XXII. of the active powers of the mind, or the powers which excite to action. All throughout, he gains a delusive simplicity, simply by overlooking an element, commonly the main element, in the phenomenon. Desire is the same thing as the idea of a pleasure, " and the number of our desires is the same with that of our pleasurable sensations; the number of our aversions, the same with that of our painful sensations."I hold that desire is something superadded to mere sensation, and indicating a higher capacity, and that we may and ought to desire many things beside mere sensations of pleasure. He then proceeds to show us in the way the Scottish metaphysicians had done, from Hutcheson and Turnbull downwards; how the desire of pleasure gives rise to other impulses, which may by association become ends, and not mere means; such as, wealth, power, dignity, friendship, kindness, family, country, party, mankind. A man looks upon his child as a cause to him of future pains and pleasures, much more certain than any other person; " and thus gathers round it a whole host of associations that constitute parental love. All this I admit will mingle with and strengthen family affection; but in the heart of the affection there is a natural {387} love on the part of parents for their children. In accounting for the love of beauty, he takes advantage of Alison's theory, a theory not favored by those who have discovered mathematical relations in beautiful forms. The following quotation will en able us to understand what he means by motives: "As every pleasure is worth having, -- for otherwise it would not be a pleasure, -- the idea of every pleasure associated with that of an action of ours as the cause is a motive; that is, leads to the action. But every motive does not produce the action. The reason is, the existence of other motives which prevent it. A man is tempted to commit adultery with the wife of his friend: the composition of the motive is obvious. He does not obey the motive. Why? He obeys other motives which are stronger. Though pleasures are associated with the immoral act, pains are associated with it also; the pains of the injured husband, the pains of the injured wife, the moral indignation of man kind, the future reproaches of his own mind. Some men obey the first rather than the second motive. The reason is obvious. In them the association of the act with the pleasure is, from habit, unduly strong: