The Scottish Philosophy [232]
the association of the act with the pains is, from want of habit, unduly weak. This is a case of education." I believe that if men were trained to think that chastity has no other foundation than Mr. Mill has given it, the husband would be little attended to when he claimed to be injured, and the wife would cease to believe that she had injured any one, and the moral indignation of mankind would disappear; thus perilous would it be to remove morality from its foundation in moral principle, and place it on the shifting sand of association.
We are prepared for his analysis of the moral sense. "It is interesting here to observe by what a potent call we are summoned to virtue. Of all that we enjoy more is derived from those acts of other men on which we bestow the name I virtue,' than from any other cause. Our own virtue is the principal cause why other men reciprocate the acts of virtue towards us: with the idea of our own acts of virtue there are naturally associated the ideas of all the immense advantages we derive from the virtuous acts of our fellow- creatures. When this association is formed in due strength, which it is the main business of a good education to effect, the motive of virtue becomes paramount in the human breast." By all means let us try to collect {388} good associations round virtuous acts; but, as the centre and bond of the whole, let us have the principle that virtuous acts should be done because they are right. Discard this restraint, and attractive associations will be sure to gather round vice. He tells us (" Fragment on Mackintosh "), that his analysis of virtue into the love of pleasure and association does not lessen the influence of the motive. " Gratitude remains gratitude, resentment remains resentment, generosity, generosity in the mind of him who feels them, after analysis, the same as before." Yes in the mind of him " who feels them; " but the feeling may be undermined, and remorse for sin be quieted.
He closes the work with a discussion as to will and intention. Will is the peculiar state of mind or consciousness by which action is preceded. He treats of its influence over the actions of the body, and over the actions of the mind. He shows that sensations and ideas are the true antecedents of the bodily actions, and so he does not need to call in a separate capacity called the will. He then turns to the power which the mind seems to possess over its associations. He proves, as Brown and others had done, that we cannot will an absent idea before us, -- for to will it is already to have it; and the recalling is always a process of association. He does not see that, by a stern act of will, we can detain a present thought, and thus gather around it a whole host of associations. He speaks of ends, but has no idea of the way in which ends spring up and influence the mind. He takes no notice of the essential freedom belonging to the will, and thus leaves no ground on which to rear the doctrine of human responsibility.
LII. -- JOHN BALLANTYNE.[97] H/E\ was born at Piteddie, parish of Kinghorn, Fifeshire, May 8, 1778, and received his early education in the village school of Lochgelly. He matriculated in the university of Edinburgh in 1795, and seems there to have enjoyed the privilege of sitting under the instructions of Dugald Stewart. His parents belonged to the church of Scotland, but from conscientious motives, and from perceiving the want of religion in the students intending for the ministry in that body, he joined the burgher branch of the seceders, and attended their theological hall, where his metaphysical abilities were noticed by his professor Dr. Lawson. After being licensed to preach the gospel, he taught schools at Lochgelly, and at Colinsburgh. In 1805, he was settled as minister in the shire of Kincardine, at Stonehaven, a some what exposed place on the German ocean, but made interesting by bold rocks in the neighborhood, and a grand old ruined castle where the covenanters had been imprisoned. There he ministered
We are prepared for his analysis of the moral sense. "It is interesting here to observe by what a potent call we are summoned to virtue. Of all that we enjoy more is derived from those acts of other men on which we bestow the name I virtue,' than from any other cause. Our own virtue is the principal cause why other men reciprocate the acts of virtue towards us: with the idea of our own acts of virtue there are naturally associated the ideas of all the immense advantages we derive from the virtuous acts of our fellow- creatures. When this association is formed in due strength, which it is the main business of a good education to effect, the motive of virtue becomes paramount in the human breast." By all means let us try to collect {388} good associations round virtuous acts; but, as the centre and bond of the whole, let us have the principle that virtuous acts should be done because they are right. Discard this restraint, and attractive associations will be sure to gather round vice. He tells us (" Fragment on Mackintosh "), that his analysis of virtue into the love of pleasure and association does not lessen the influence of the motive. " Gratitude remains gratitude, resentment remains resentment, generosity, generosity in the mind of him who feels them, after analysis, the same as before." Yes in the mind of him " who feels them; " but the feeling may be undermined, and remorse for sin be quieted.
He closes the work with a discussion as to will and intention. Will is the peculiar state of mind or consciousness by which action is preceded. He treats of its influence over the actions of the body, and over the actions of the mind. He shows that sensations and ideas are the true antecedents of the bodily actions, and so he does not need to call in a separate capacity called the will. He then turns to the power which the mind seems to possess over its associations. He proves, as Brown and others had done, that we cannot will an absent idea before us, -- for to will it is already to have it; and the recalling is always a process of association. He does not see that, by a stern act of will, we can detain a present thought, and thus gather around it a whole host of associations. He speaks of ends, but has no idea of the way in which ends spring up and influence the mind. He takes no notice of the essential freedom belonging to the will, and thus leaves no ground on which to rear the doctrine of human responsibility.
LII. -- JOHN BALLANTYNE.[97] H/E\ was born at Piteddie, parish of Kinghorn, Fifeshire, May 8, 1778, and received his early education in the village school of Lochgelly. He matriculated in the university of Edinburgh in 1795, and seems there to have enjoyed the privilege of sitting under the instructions of Dugald Stewart. His parents belonged to the church of Scotland, but from conscientious motives, and from perceiving the want of religion in the students intending for the ministry in that body, he joined the burgher branch of the seceders, and attended their theological hall, where his metaphysical abilities were noticed by his professor Dr. Lawson. After being licensed to preach the gospel, he taught schools at Lochgelly, and at Colinsburgh. In 1805, he was settled as minister in the shire of Kincardine, at Stonehaven, a some what exposed place on the German ocean, but made interesting by bold rocks in the neighborhood, and a grand old ruined castle where the covenanters had been imprisoned. There he ministered