The Scottish Philosophy [286]
120. Mr. Gordon. -- How far is an expensive taste of living connected with corruption of manners and the ruin of a nation? 121. Dr. Gerard. -- What are the ways in which watering operates in improving land? March 24, 1772. 122. Dr. Beattie. -- How far is versification essential to poetry? 123. Dr. George Skene. 124. Mr. Ogilvy. -- By what circumstances has slavery been so moderated as to become supportable to so many nations of mankind? 125. Dr. Dunbar. 126. Mr. Trail. -- Does Dr. Halley's theory of evaporation sufficiently account for the constant influx into the Mediterranean at the Straits of Gibraltar?
ART. III. MSS. ( 192, 223.)
I.. This paper is in no fewer than five forms, showing what pains he took with it. One or two of the forms were notes or preparations, the other three fully written out as if to be read before a society.
By the modern system of materialism he means that advanced by Dr. Priestley in his " Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit," 1777, and " Free Discussion of the Doctrines of Materialism and Philosophical Necessity," 1777. The paper is of a thorough and searching character, distinguished for acuteness beyond almost any of the published writings of Reid, and written with great point and naivete. It looks as if designed for publication. Chap. 1.. Here he describes the views entertained of substance by eminent men, criticising ably the defective views of Locke. Chap. II. , showing that he had profoundly studied Newton. He gives fair explanations of Newton's rules. He shows that Priestley does not follow these rules. Chap. III. , showing there is an ambiguity in the meaning of the word solidity, and that Priestley has not succeeded in showing that matter is not solid or impenetrable. Chap. IV. , showing that Priestley does not follow Newton. The whole is the result of much reading and reflection. ".
II. He shows that Hartley's views were unfounded hypotheses, but speaks with great fondness and respect of Hartley. He is very severe upon Priestley's employment of Hartley's theories, particularly upon his attempt to explain every mental faculty by association. He refers to Aristotle's views of association. He shows that association cannot account for memory, which was explained by the vividness of the ideas. " Every man knows what memory is, and every man knows what is meant by vividness of ideas or conceptions, and their power of suggesting one another; and when we know and understand what each of these things is we can be at no loss to know whether they are one and the same. Let every man judge for himself whether memory is a certain degree {474} of vividness in ideas, and of a certain degree of strength in their power of suggesting one another. To me they appear to be things quite of a different nature; and I could as easily believe that a hat is a pair of shoes as that memory is a certain degree of vividness in ideas and of strength in their association." "A malefactor that is going to be hanged has a cluster of very vivid ideas, and very strongly associated, of what he is about to suffer, but it is not the object of remembrance but of foresight;" or, "It appears evident, therefore, that something more than association of ideas is required to produce memory, and consequently that association is not of itself sufficient to explain or account for memory." He shows that association cannot account for judgment; "for if there is a power in the mind of comparing ideas and of perceiving certain relations between them, such as those of universal concurrence and perfect coincidence, this power is not that of association; for it is evident that ideas
ART. III. MSS.
I.
By the modern system of materialism he means that advanced by Dr. Priestley in his " Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit," 1777, and " Free Discussion of the Doctrines of Materialism and Philosophical Necessity," 1777. The paper is of a thorough and searching character, distinguished for acuteness beyond almost any of the published writings of Reid, and written with great point and naivete. It looks as if designed for publication. Chap. 1.
II