The Scottish Philosophy [287]
may be associated with any degree of strength without being compared, without perception of any relation between them." He shows in much the same way that association cannot account for the passions and volition. He shows in the same paper that Priestley's attempt to get Locke's ideas of reflection from sensation utterly fails. Priestley had said, "got by abstraction." "We would be glad to be informed by Dr. Priestley whether a man, when he thinks, is not conscious of his thoughts? Whether he has not the power of reflecting upon his own thoughts and making them an object of thought," &c.
III.. "The liberty of the will is a phrase similar to that of the liberty of speech. The last signifies not a power inherent in speech, but a power in the man to speak this or that. In like manner, the liberty of the will signifies not a power inherent in the will, but a power in man to will this or that." "This power is given by his Maker; and, at his pleasure whose gift it is, it may be enlarged or diminished, continued or withdrawn. No power in the creature can be independent of the Creator. The hook is in its nose; he can give it line as far as he sees fit, and when he pleases can restrain it or turn it whither soever he will. Let this be always understood when we ascribe liberty to man or to any created being. Supposing it therefore to be true that man is a free agent, it may be true at the same time that his liberty may be impugned or lost by disorder of body or of mind, as in melancholy or in madness; it may be impaired or lost by vicious habits; it may in particular cases be restrained by divine interposition." He explains cause and effect, native and active power, liberty and necessity, standing up for efficient cause. In a fragmentary paper upon the same subject, perhaps a continuation: "I grant that all rational beings are influenced and ought to be influenced by motives. But the relation between a motive and the action is of a very different nature from the relation between an efficient cause and its effect. An efficient cause must be a being that exists and has power to produce the effect. A motive is not a thing that exists. It is only a thing conceived in the mind of the agent, and is what the schoolmen called an ens rationis, and therefore cannot possibly be the efficient cause of any thing. It may influence to action, but it cannot act. It is like advice or persuasion, which may have an influence of the same kind with that of motives; but they leave the man still at liberty and indeed suppose liberty. For in vain is advice given if the person be not at liberty either to follow or reject it. In like manner, motives suppose liberty in the agent, otherwise they have no influence at all."
IV.. Apparently a very old paper, not written with care for the press. "Everything that is made must have some constitution, -- some fabric, make, or nature,-from Which all its qualities, appearances' powers, and operations do result" "It is one thing to say such a truth depends upon my constitution; {475}it is another thing to say that my perception of that truth depends on my constitution, and these two things ought most carefully to be distinguished." "My perception of every self-evident truth depends upon my constitution, and is the immediate effect of my constitution, and of that truth being presented to my mind. As soon as this truth is understood that two and two make four, I immediately assent to it, because God has given me the faculty of discerning immediately its truth, and if I had not this faculty I would not perceive this truth; but it would be a true proposition still, although I did not perceive its truth. The truth itself therefore does not depend upon my constitution, for it was a truth before I had an existence, and will be a truth, although I were annihilate; but my perception of it evidently depends upon my constitution, and particularly upon my having as a part of my constitution that faculty (whether you call it reason or common sense) by which I perceive or
III.
IV.