in Spain (the brother of an existing SIS officer), agent ‘01010’, who began work at the end of 1945. Reflecting his position and expertise, the primary requirements were economic, including background material relating to ‘civil aviation between Spain and Portugal and U.S.A.’, ‘What, if any, strings are being pulled by Spain or foreign big business . . . in connection with trade negotiations with France and Switzerland?’, and ‘particulars of any outside and backstairs influences, domestic or foreign, at work in high quarters in connection with the British/Spanish trade relationships’. Political intelligence was less of a priority, but the agent was asked to keep an eye out for material about the Monarchist movement, the Spanish Communist Party, and ‘information on any German attempts to hide key-men, plans, loot, etc. in Spain’. The agent’s first report contained quite a lot of information evidently gathered from open sources, and prompted a mild rebuke from his SIS handler, which provides us with a useful indication of what the Service regarded as core business. ‘It should be remembered’, wrote the case-officer, ‘that it is the function of H.M. Embassies and Consulates to provide the F.O. with overt information, general surveys of the situation, etc. We do not, therefore, require such material from our sources. What we do require is factual, specific and well authenticated items of information which are not accessible to Embassies and Consulates through overt channels.’ He added that ‘the most valuable type of secret political material is documentary’, and every effort should be made to acquire it. The Service was ‘always interested in reports based on off the record remarks made by individuals who are known to be in a position to speak with inside knowledge and authority on the subject under discussion and who do not know that their remarks will get back to this country’. Such information was particularly valuable since direct liaison with Franco’s intelligence authorities was ruled out by the Foreign Office. It was, commented Aubrey Halford in June 1948, ‘useless to pretend that C’s representatives can have a personal liaison with the Franco secret police without bringing the Embassy into it’, and the Spanish would be bound to ‘want something in return’ for any help they gave. Writing to Menzies, Hayter acknowledged that it would be ‘gratifying’ to receive intelligence on Communist methods and activities, but that the Foreign Office felt ‘the price the Spaniards are asking is too high, namely that we should in effect condone the regime’.19
Late in 1948 an opportunity was taken of giving a questionnaire to a well-placed Briton who had worked alongside the Service during the war and was travelling on vacation to Spain. Aware that he had good political connections, the Political Requirements Section in Broadway asked if he were ‘able to talk confidentially with important political persons or with responsible persons close to Franco’ and whether he could collect information on ‘any movements towards the restoration of the monarchy on the part of left wing democrats, monarchists and Franco respectively’; on the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church towards Franco and domestic political issues; and on ‘evidence of any secret discussions between the U.S.S.R. and Franco’s regime’. In keeping with the growing emphasis on economic intelligence, he was also asked to report on authoritative Spanish attitudes towards the ‘chaotic economic conditions’ in Spain and ‘Hispano-Argentine commercial relations’.
The example of one potential agent who worked in France and Spain further illustrates both postwar intelligence priorities and also how a fly-fishing technique of tempting and reeling in people could be applied in practice. The target in this case was a former wartime contact, now resident in France. In February 1948 the head of the Madrid station reported that the man, who was ‘extremely well informed as usual’, had visited Spain where he had had ‘several long talks’ with an SIS colleague. Thinking that he might make a good source