The Secret History of MI6 - Keith Jeffery [401]
SIS had considered using international humanitarian organisation cover before. In April 1946 there was a discussion about the possibility of getting an agent working in one such agency. Despite the fact that it was assumed that the agency in question was already ‘completely penetrated’ by the Communists, it was felt that in certain countries where such organisations operate, ‘e.g. the Balkans and other Russian dominated countries, it might well be the only way in which an S.I.S. officer could get into contact with the people of the country owing to the almost complete isolation in which the Embassy staffs lived’. Head Office was keen to proceed with the operation. ‘This looks even more promising than we anticipated,’ minuted one officer, particularly as the organisation was ‘reported to be Communist penetrated’. Even if he were working for French intelligence, ‘I do not consider it constitutes a reason for turning him down.’ In France, meanwhile, a representative in Paris had ‘established very friendly relations with subject’, who was aware he was dealing with British intelligence and now appeared ‘to be upset’ that contact was being maintained only on ‘purely social lines’ and that no ‘shop matters’ were being discussed. London therefore cabled that ‘relations’ could now be put ‘on business footing’. The potential agent should be asked to report on the degree of Communist penetration, but London considered it ‘advisable [to] leave French political questions in abeyance until we know subject better’. Paris then proceeded formally to recruit the agent, who was obviously raring to go. ‘Source appeared to jump to the conclusion’, reported Paris, ‘that we were interested in establishing, through him, a “reseau” [network] through Europe.’ One drawback of such a scheme, said the agent, was that the Americans, who provided most of the money for the organisation, ‘and were manoeuvring themselves into most of the key positions, were, he strongly suspected, working on similar lines’. On the other hand, a point in the scheme’s favour was that this particular humanitarian organisation was thought to be ‘the only one that stood a chance of continuing to function throughout Europe for a period of several months after the outbreak of hostilities’. Thus ‘it was worth while trying to exploit it as a means