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The Secret History of MI6 - Keith Jeffery [401]

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for French political information, an initial approach was made ‘on the basis of [a] mutual interest’ in international Communism. The target said he was ‘willing to meet a representative once a week’ to provide information on this topic. Madrid recommended proceeding on the basis that ‘for the time being’ the main subject should be restricted to Communist matters, ‘that the contact should be regular and great interest maintained’, and, ‘if properly handled, it will not be long before subject lets himself wander into the field of normal political matters as well’. Aware that the right psychological attitude was required, Madrid added that ‘subject should not be allowed to gain the impression that he is being fitted into an existing machine. This impression might make him shy off.’ The Paris station took up the baton and through the spring of 1948 began a series of meetings with the target ‘on a purely social basis’. Paris reported that the individual had now got a job with an international humanitarian organisation, which would involve him travelling frequently in the ‘Russian satellites’ in Eastern Europe, and added their impression that he would ‘be prepared to carry out an observation mission for us’ during his visits to Eastern Europe, and ‘would accept payment’, though they said that ‘neither point was, of course, discussed directly’. The target would be based in France, moreover, and was apparently prepared to ‘pass us information about such subjects as Communist penetration of French administration, [and] Communist blackmail against non-Communist French politicians’. The only evident snag was a worry that he might ‘also be in touch with French Intelligence’ and might already ‘have been recruited by them to carry out similar missions’.

SIS had considered using international humanitarian organisation cover before. In April 1946 there was a discussion about the possibility of getting an agent working in one such agency. Despite the fact that it was assumed that the agency in question was already ‘completely penetrated’ by the Communists, it was felt that in certain countries where such organisations operate, ‘e.g. the Balkans and other Russian dominated countries, it might well be the only way in which an S.I.S. officer could get into contact with the people of the country owing to the almost complete isolation in which the Embassy staffs lived’. Head Office was keen to proceed with the operation. ‘This looks even more promising than we anticipated,’ minuted one officer, particularly as the organisation was ‘reported to be Communist penetrated’. Even if he were working for French intelligence, ‘I do not consider it constitutes a reason for turning him down.’ In France, meanwhile, a representative in Paris had ‘established very friendly relations with subject’, who was aware he was dealing with British intelligence and now appeared ‘to be upset’ that contact was being maintained only on ‘purely social lines’ and that no ‘shop matters’ were being discussed. London therefore cabled that ‘relations’ could now be put ‘on business footing’. The potential agent should be asked to report on the degree of Communist penetration, but London considered it ‘advisable [to] leave French political questions in abeyance until we know subject better’. Paris then proceeded formally to recruit the agent, who was obviously raring to go. ‘Source appeared to jump to the conclusion’, reported Paris, ‘that we were interested in establishing, through him, a “reseau” [network] through Europe.’ One drawback of such a scheme, said the agent, was that the Americans, who provided most of the money for the organisation, ‘and were manoeuvring themselves into most of the key positions, were, he strongly suspected, working on similar lines’. On the other hand, a point in the scheme’s favour was that this particular humanitarian organisation was thought to be ‘the only one that stood a chance of continuing to function throughout Europe for a period of several months after the outbreak of hostilities’. Thus ‘it was worth while trying to exploit it as a means

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