THE SEVENTH LETTER [12]
fourth, there is the
knowledge itself, and, as fifth, we must count the thing itself
which is known and truly exists. The first is the name, the, second
the definition, the third. the image, and the fourth the knowledge. If
you wish to learn what I mean, take these in the case of one instance,
and so understand them in the case of all. A circle is a thing
spoken of, and its name is that very word which we have just
uttered. The second thing belonging to it is its definition, made up
names and verbal forms. For that which has the name "round,"
"annular," or, "circle," might be defined as that which has the
distance from its circumference to its centre everywhere equal. Third,
comes that which is drawn and rubbed out again, or turned on a lathe
and broken up-none of which things can happen to the circle
itself-to which the other things, mentioned have reference; for it
is something of a different order from them. Fourth, comes
knowledge, intelligence and right opinion about these things. Under
this one head we must group everything which has its existence, not in
words nor in bodily shapes, but in souls-from which it is dear that it
is something different from the nature of the circle itself and from
the three things mentioned before. Of these things intelligence
comes closest in kinship and likeness to the fifth, and the others are
farther distant.
The same applies to straight as well as to circular form, to
colours, to the good, the, beautiful, the just, to all bodies
whether manufactured or coming into being in the course of nature,
to fire, water, and all such things, to every living being, to
character in souls, and to all things done and suffered. For in the
case of all these, no one, if he has not some how or other got hold of
the four things first mentioned, can ever be completely a partaker
of knowledge of the fifth. Further, on account of the weakness of
language, these (i.e., the four) attempt to show what each thing is
like, not less than what each thing is. For this reason no man of
intelligence will venture to express his philosophical views in
language, especially not in language that is unchangeable, which is
true of that which is set down in written characters.
Again you must learn the point which comes next. Every circle, of
those which are by the act of man drawn or even turned on a lathe,
is full of that which is opposite to the fifth thing. For everywhere
it has contact with the straight. But the circle itself, we say, has
nothing in either smaller or greater, of that which is its opposite.
We say also that the name is not a thing of permanence for any of
them, and that nothing prevents the things now called round from being
called straight, and the straight things round; for those who make
changes and call things by opposite names, nothing will be less
permanent (than a name). Again with regard to the definition, if it is
made up of names and verbal forms, the same remark holds that there is
no sufficiently durable permanence in it. And there is no end to the
instances of the ambiguity from which each of the four suffers; but
the greatest of them is that which we mentioned a little earlier,
that, whereas there are two things, that which has real being, and
that which is only a quality, when the soul is seeking to know, not
the quality, but the essence, each of the four, presenting to the soul
by word and in act that which it is not seeking (i.e., the quality), a
thing open to refutation by the senses, being merely the thing
presented to the soul in each particular case whether by statement
or the act of showing, fills, one may say, every man with puzzlement
and perplexity.
Now in subjects in which, by reason of our defective education, we
have not been accustomed even to search for the truth, but are
satisfied with whatever images are presented to us, we are not held up
to ridicule by one another, the questioned by questioners, who can
pull to pieces and criticise the four things.
knowledge itself, and, as fifth, we must count the thing itself
which is known and truly exists. The first is the name, the, second
the definition, the third. the image, and the fourth the knowledge. If
you wish to learn what I mean, take these in the case of one instance,
and so understand them in the case of all. A circle is a thing
spoken of, and its name is that very word which we have just
uttered. The second thing belonging to it is its definition, made up
names and verbal forms. For that which has the name "round,"
"annular," or, "circle," might be defined as that which has the
distance from its circumference to its centre everywhere equal. Third,
comes that which is drawn and rubbed out again, or turned on a lathe
and broken up-none of which things can happen to the circle
itself-to which the other things, mentioned have reference; for it
is something of a different order from them. Fourth, comes
knowledge, intelligence and right opinion about these things. Under
this one head we must group everything which has its existence, not in
words nor in bodily shapes, but in souls-from which it is dear that it
is something different from the nature of the circle itself and from
the three things mentioned before. Of these things intelligence
comes closest in kinship and likeness to the fifth, and the others are
farther distant.
The same applies to straight as well as to circular form, to
colours, to the good, the, beautiful, the just, to all bodies
whether manufactured or coming into being in the course of nature,
to fire, water, and all such things, to every living being, to
character in souls, and to all things done and suffered. For in the
case of all these, no one, if he has not some how or other got hold of
the four things first mentioned, can ever be completely a partaker
of knowledge of the fifth. Further, on account of the weakness of
language, these (i.e., the four) attempt to show what each thing is
like, not less than what each thing is. For this reason no man of
intelligence will venture to express his philosophical views in
language, especially not in language that is unchangeable, which is
true of that which is set down in written characters.
Again you must learn the point which comes next. Every circle, of
those which are by the act of man drawn or even turned on a lathe,
is full of that which is opposite to the fifth thing. For everywhere
it has contact with the straight. But the circle itself, we say, has
nothing in either smaller or greater, of that which is its opposite.
We say also that the name is not a thing of permanence for any of
them, and that nothing prevents the things now called round from being
called straight, and the straight things round; for those who make
changes and call things by opposite names, nothing will be less
permanent (than a name). Again with regard to the definition, if it is
made up of names and verbal forms, the same remark holds that there is
no sufficiently durable permanence in it. And there is no end to the
instances of the ambiguity from which each of the four suffers; but
the greatest of them is that which we mentioned a little earlier,
that, whereas there are two things, that which has real being, and
that which is only a quality, when the soul is seeking to know, not
the quality, but the essence, each of the four, presenting to the soul
by word and in act that which it is not seeking (i.e., the quality), a
thing open to refutation by the senses, being merely the thing
presented to the soul in each particular case whether by statement
or the act of showing, fills, one may say, every man with puzzlement
and perplexity.
Now in subjects in which, by reason of our defective education, we
have not been accustomed even to search for the truth, but are
satisfied with whatever images are presented to us, we are not held up
to ridicule by one another, the questioned by questioners, who can
pull to pieces and criticise the four things.