THE SEVENTH LETTER [13]
But in subjects where we
try to compel a man to give a clear answer about the fifth, any one of
those who are capable of overthrowing an antagonist gets the better of
us, and makes the man, who gives an exposition in speech or writing or
in replies to questions, appear to most of his hearers to know nothing
of the things on which he is attempting to write or speak; for they
are sometimes not aware that it is not the mind of the writer or
speaker which is proved to be at fault, but the defective nature of
each of the four instruments. The process however of dealing with
all of these, as the mind moves up and down to each in turn, does
after much effort give birth in a well-constituted mind to knowledge
of that which is well constituted. But if a man is ill-constituted
by nature (as the state of the soul is naturally in the majority
both in its capacity for learning and in what is called moral
character)-or it may have become so by deterioration-not even
Lynceus could endow such men with the power of sight.
In one word, the man who has no natural kinship with this matter
cannot be made akin to it by quickness of learning or memory; for it
cannot be engendered at all in natures which are foreign to it.
Therefore, if men are not by nature kinship allied to justice and
all other things that are honourable, though they may be good at
learning and remembering other knowledge of various kinds-or if they
have the kinship but are slow learners and have no memory-none of
all these will ever learn to the full the truth about virtue and vice.
For both must be learnt together; and together also must be learnt, by
complete and long continued study, as I said at the beginning, the
true and the false about all that has real being. After much effort,
as names, definitions, sights, and other data of sense, are brought
into contact and friction one with another, in the course of
scrutiny and kindly testing by men who proceed by question and
answer without ill will, with a sudden flash there shines forth
understanding about every problem, and an intelligence whose efforts
reach the furthest limits of human powers. Therefore every man of
worth, when dealing with matters of worth, will be far from exposing
them to ill feeling and misunderstanding among men by committing
them to writing. In one word, then, it may be known from this that, if
one sees written treatises composed by anyone, either the laws of a
lawgiver, or in any other form whatever, these are not for that man
the things of most worth, if he is a man of worth, but that his
treasures are laid up in the fairest spot that he possesses. But if
these things were worked at by him as things of real worth, and
committed to writing, then surely, not gods, but men "have
themselves bereft him of his wits."
Anyone who has followed this discourse and digression will know well
that, if Dionysios or anyone else, great or small, has written a
treatise on the highest matters and the first principles of things, he
has, so I say, neither heard nor learnt any sound teaching about the
subject of his treatise; otherwise, he would have had the same
reverence for it, which I have, and would have shrunk from putting
it forth into a world of discord and uncomeliness. For he wrote it,
not as an aid to memory-since there is no risk of forgetting it, if
a man's soul has once laid hold of it; for it is expressed in the
shortest of statements-but if he wrote it at all, it was from a mean
craving for honour, either putting it forth as his own invention, or
to figure as a man possessed of culture, of which he was not worthy,
if his heart was set on the credit of possessing it. If then Dionysios
gained this culture from the one lesson which he had from me, we may
perhaps grant him the possession of it, though how he acquired
it-God wot, as the Theban says; for I gave him the teaching, which I
have described, on that one occasion and never again.
The next point which requires to be made clear
try to compel a man to give a clear answer about the fifth, any one of
those who are capable of overthrowing an antagonist gets the better of
us, and makes the man, who gives an exposition in speech or writing or
in replies to questions, appear to most of his hearers to know nothing
of the things on which he is attempting to write or speak; for they
are sometimes not aware that it is not the mind of the writer or
speaker which is proved to be at fault, but the defective nature of
each of the four instruments. The process however of dealing with
all of these, as the mind moves up and down to each in turn, does
after much effort give birth in a well-constituted mind to knowledge
of that which is well constituted. But if a man is ill-constituted
by nature (as the state of the soul is naturally in the majority
both in its capacity for learning and in what is called moral
character)-or it may have become so by deterioration-not even
Lynceus could endow such men with the power of sight.
In one word, the man who has no natural kinship with this matter
cannot be made akin to it by quickness of learning or memory; for it
cannot be engendered at all in natures which are foreign to it.
Therefore, if men are not by nature kinship allied to justice and
all other things that are honourable, though they may be good at
learning and remembering other knowledge of various kinds-or if they
have the kinship but are slow learners and have no memory-none of
all these will ever learn to the full the truth about virtue and vice.
For both must be learnt together; and together also must be learnt, by
complete and long continued study, as I said at the beginning, the
true and the false about all that has real being. After much effort,
as names, definitions, sights, and other data of sense, are brought
into contact and friction one with another, in the course of
scrutiny and kindly testing by men who proceed by question and
answer without ill will, with a sudden flash there shines forth
understanding about every problem, and an intelligence whose efforts
reach the furthest limits of human powers. Therefore every man of
worth, when dealing with matters of worth, will be far from exposing
them to ill feeling and misunderstanding among men by committing
them to writing. In one word, then, it may be known from this that, if
one sees written treatises composed by anyone, either the laws of a
lawgiver, or in any other form whatever, these are not for that man
the things of most worth, if he is a man of worth, but that his
treasures are laid up in the fairest spot that he possesses. But if
these things were worked at by him as things of real worth, and
committed to writing, then surely, not gods, but men "have
themselves bereft him of his wits."
Anyone who has followed this discourse and digression will know well
that, if Dionysios or anyone else, great or small, has written a
treatise on the highest matters and the first principles of things, he
has, so I say, neither heard nor learnt any sound teaching about the
subject of his treatise; otherwise, he would have had the same
reverence for it, which I have, and would have shrunk from putting
it forth into a world of discord and uncomeliness. For he wrote it,
not as an aid to memory-since there is no risk of forgetting it, if
a man's soul has once laid hold of it; for it is expressed in the
shortest of statements-but if he wrote it at all, it was from a mean
craving for honour, either putting it forth as his own invention, or
to figure as a man possessed of culture, of which he was not worthy,
if his heart was set on the credit of possessing it. If then Dionysios
gained this culture from the one lesson which he had from me, we may
perhaps grant him the possession of it, though how he acquired
it-God wot, as the Theban says; for I gave him the teaching, which I
have described, on that one occasion and never again.
The next point which requires to be made clear