The Super Summary of World History - Alan Dale Daniel [231]
When the Americans arrived with their B-17 “flying fortress,” they were sure they could carry out daylight raids against German industrial targets. The American’s thought by using the top-secret Norden bombsight the B-17s could put bombs right on the industrial target, thereby avoiding unnecessary civilian deaths and damaged homes. In fact, the B-17’s bombs seldom fell on the target when dropped from high altitudes. In the beginning, American losses were high but acceptable. The British raids were costing them far less in terms of crew and aircraft losses, but at times the raids missed entire towns. American airmen went forward with the daylight bombing, but the losses were climbing. Bomber Command kept trying to talk the Americans into joining the night raids, but American commanders thought they were on the right track. It went unsaid, but at first the US Airmen thought their approach avoided unnecessary civilian deaths and was therefore morally superior. This did not hold as the war progressed to firebombing entire cities, and any attempt to justify the bombing was summed up by “they started it.”[317]
On August 28, 1943, and October 14, 1943, the USAAF staged daylight attacks on the Schweinfurt ball bearing plants. Allied analysis of the Nazi war machine had shown these ball bearing plants were critical. An all-out effort might destroy the Achilles heel of Nazi industrial power. However, the ball bearing plants were deep within the Reich, and the raids were disasters.
“In the famous and much-discussed second attack on October 14, 1943, when the plants were again severely damaged, one of the decisive air battles of the war took place. The 228 bombers participating were strongly attacked by German fighters when beyond the range of their fighter escort. Losses to fighters and to flak cost the United States forces 62 planes with another 138 damaged in varying degree, some beyond repair. Repeated losses of this magnitude could not be sustained; deep penetrations without escort, of which this was among the earliest, were suspended; and attacks on Schweinfurt were not renewed for four months.” (US Strategic Bombing Survey)
This report is an understatement. German radar detected the attack’s approach, and the course taken by the bombers allowed the Germans to deduce the target. Additional fighters quickly arrived at key airfields along the route to intercept the B-17s both on their way to Schweinfurt and back. The raiders were butchered. Until long-range escorts could be developed, deep raids into Germany were cancelled. By December of 1943, the P-51 Mustang was reaching the end of its development and started becoming part of the Eighth Army Air Force.[318] In a few months, they would arrive in sufficient numbers to influence the air battles in early 1944.
The British were not deterred. Bomber Harris planned a prodigious series of night raids on Berlin to win the war outright through bombing the Nazi capital. Germany had been working on deterrent measures and put together both an improved radar system and a night interceptor network before the powerful British operation was underway. When the raids began on Berlin the British bomber force suffered high losses, and the losses increased as the size of the raids increased. During the three and one-half month battle of Berlin, the RAF lost over 1,000 bombers. Finally, even Harris had to admit the losses were too high, and the Berlin bomber offensive finally came to a halt.
As the escorts began to make their numbers felt, the long-range daylight raids could begin once more. A new general was at the head of the Eighth USAAF, General Doolittle, the same man who had led the daring raid on Tokyo, Japan, in 1942. General Doolittle saw at once that the use of US Air power was wrong. He changed the emphasis from attacking almost any German production facilities to attacking the German air force and its production facilities. General Doolittle sent