The Super Summary of World History - Alan Dale Daniel [232]
After the defeat of the Luftwaffe, Allied bombers and fighters roamed the German skies at will, bombing and strafing everything. Doolittle had applied the precepts of the famous writer Clausewitz and his masterwork book On War. By defeating the enemy’s army in the field first, the Luftwaffe being Germany’s air army, so to speak, afterward he could do whatever he wanted. He wanted to bomb and machine gun Germany into submission, and his pilots did their best to accomplish the objective. In the end, Germany did not fall because of the Allied air offensive. The German air force was destroyed, and that gave the Allies tactical air control over the battlefield—which made an enormous difference in the outcome of numerous battles. At the Battle of the Bulge, for example, Allied air power played a significant role in turning the tide against the German offensive. And without total control of the air, D-Day’s amphibious assault may have been impossible.
When studying modern wars, think about how many battles were won when the winner on the ground controlled the air. It is quickly seen that the side ruling the sky has an enormous edge. If one cannot rule the skies, the airspace must at least be contested; otherwise the combatant controlling the air wins the ground battle.[319]
The problem with the bomber offensive was that the cost may not have justified the benefit gained. Of course, when people are saying the bomber will win the war there is a tendency to wonder if what was promised was delivered. In fact, it was not. The war in Europe was not won by air power. Troops still had to land and beat up the German Army to achieve victory. Air power severely damaged Germany’s ability to wage war, but the ground pounders won the war one step at a time just as they have done since Sargon conquered Ur in 2371 BC.
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey tried to assess the impact of the huge, and extremely expensive, bombing effort. In essence, the survey concluded that the air war failed to deliver on its war-winning promises. Yes, it had contributed, but so had the ships and all the rest of the combat arms support units. The USAAF and the Royal Air Force always considered themselves special, because they would do more to beat Germany than other Allied units. They were wrong. The fellow face down in the mud with bullets flying over his head was the ultimate key to victory. He always has been.
The result: the air war was important, but not of supreme importance. After the war, the major air forces of the world perked up because of the atomic bomb. Now they possessed a war-winning weapon, and air power was king. At least for a while. No doubt the bomb could destroy armies as well as civilization, but who would use it? In small wars, such as Korea (only a million or more killed there—very “small”), the Communist guessed the United States would not deploy the weapon, and they were correct. American scruples tied its hands and gave the communists an edge. The USSR stole the bomb quickly and cheaply through effective spying, and two (and later three, and then four, and so on) nations aimed nuclear warheads at one another. Meanwhile, wars continue to start, and many almost never end (Vietnam, etc.). What good was the bomb?
The air force never wanted to be “flying artillery,” but that was why they were originally attached to the army. Reconnaissance and close air support WERE the