The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [121]
Once the Gorbachev-Roh meeting was arranged, the United States did all it could to facilitate it. At the urging of the Blue House, which considered a signal of continued U.S. alliance to be vital, President Bush agreed to receive Roh at the White House following the California event. The visible show of American support for the breakthrough, Gregg reported to Washington, "may finally drive a stake through the heart" of a widespread South Korean belief that the United States was opposed to direct contacts between Seoul and Moscow.
The site for the meeting in San Francisco turned out to be more of a problem than anyone had anticipated. For security, convenience, and possibly symbolic reasons, the Soviet side proposed the Soviet Consulate General in the northern California city, but the Koreans adamantly resisted this because of historical overtones they considered shameful. In 1896, King Kojong had taken refuge in the Russian legation in Seoul for a year to escape assassination by the Japanese, with the result that Russia won special rights and benefits in a weakened Korea. This humiliation had never been forgotten in Korea, where historians coined a special word, akwanpachon, for "kings taking refuge in the Russian legation." After much discussion, the Soviets agreed to hold the meeting in Gorbachev's suite at the Fairmont Hotel.
Although the meeting itself was an unremarkable exchange of generalities, the event marked "a radical change" in Soviet policy from exclusive alliance with North Korea, as Gorbachev acknowledged later in an internal Kremlin report. There was no explicit decision to move to full diplomatic relations, though this was clearly implied and rapidly accomplished after Gorbachev and Roh shook hands. According to Kim Jong In, who was then Roh's senior economic aide, Roh stated near the end of the meeting that the Korean government was prepared to offer "several billion dollars" in economic support. Soviet notes taken at the meeting said Roh "announced a readiness to grant considerable credit" for the purchase of South Korean consumer goods and also pledged cooperation in creation of joint enterprises and in the opening of Soviet Asia. Others who were interviewed for this book insisted that money was not discussed, though everyone knew the issue was an important one.
When Gorbachev asked if Roh had a message for Kim Il Sung, Roh replied that he would welcome Soviet efforts to bring about a North-South rapprochement. Specificially, he asked Gorbachev to do three things: first, to tell Pyongyang that Seoul was ready to meet officially for the discussion of any outstanding question; second, to use Soviet influence to place the North on the path of external opening and internal reform; and third, to convey ROK willingness to discuss and take steps to reduce military confrontation on the peninsula. When Soviet diplomats tried to pass on Roh's message, Pyongyang refused to accept it, calling it "an unbelievable concentration of lies and slander."
At the end of the brief meeting, Roh eagerly asked for a photograph to record the two men together, knowing its political impact on both sides of the thirty-eighth parallel. Gorbachev was reluctant but was finally persuaded by Dobrynin, who argued that "it won't get published in Russia." The official Korean photographer recorded a broadly beaming Roh with his left arm in friendly fashion on the elbow of Gorbachev, who managed only a wisp of a smile.
Roh's press conference immediately afterward was broadcast live to South Korea. With the fall of the Berlin