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The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [122]

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wall and the prospect of German unification, Roh noted, Korea remained in June 1990 the only nation still divided by cold war politics. "As a result of today's meeting, the cold war ice on the Korean peninsula has now begun to crack. We expect that this will be the first major step toward a peaceful and unified Korea," he declared. Roh repeated that Seoul did not wish to isolate the North Korean regime but that the ultimate objective of his Nordpolitik policy was to induce North Korea to open up. He told the assembled reporters, "The road between Seoul and Pyongyang is now totally blocked. Accordingly, we have to choose an alternative route to the North Korean capital by way of Moscow and Beijing. This may not be the most direct route but we certainly hope it will be an effective one."

THE SHEVARDNADZE MISSION

In September 1990, three months after the Gorbachev-Roh meeting and less than two years after swearing "on my word as a party member" that the Soviet Union would not grant diplomatic recognition to South Korea, Soviet foreign minister Shevardnadze returned to Pyongyang to break the news that Moscow had decided to do just that. Shevardnadze's special Aeroflot plane arrived in a gusty wind so strong, there was doubt whether it could land, and his awkward mission met turbulence throughout. When he flew out of Pyongyang two days later, an angry Shevardnadze was smarting from accusations and threats, including a threat of accelerated nuclear weapons development, hurled at him by his North Korean counterpart, Kim Yong Nam. The Soviet foreign minister told his party, as his plane took off, that the experience had been "the most difficult, most unpleasant talk of my life."

Eduard Shevardnadze, the white-maned politician who had succeeded the long-serving Andrei Gromyko as foreign minister in 1985, was a remarkable figure. A native of the southern republic of Georgia (and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the embattled president of the struggling independent state of Georgia), Shevardnadze had had no diplomatic experience before being chosen by Gorbachev, an old friend, to be his foreign minister in 1985, the first year of the Gorbachev era. Perhaps because of his minority-group status as a Georgian in the Russian-dominated Soviet Union, Shevardnadze proved to be sensitive to the concerns of smaller nations and troubled peoples. While he was among the strongest advocates of democratic policies in domestic affairs and of the New Thinking in relations with the West, Shevardnadze was notably cautious about a rapid policy change on Korea. Alexander Bessmertnykh, who was a senior deputy to Shevardnadze and later his successor as foreign minister, said "he reasoned we have an ally, not an attractive one but a powerful one. He didn't want to give this up by forcing the pace." Another senior Foreign Ministry official, who worked closely with him on Asian matters, called Shevardnadze a very wise man. "He said it is very easy to worsen our relations with North Korea, but it would be extremely difficult to restore them."

How strongly Shevardnadze argued these points within the Kremlin inner circle during the consideration of Korea policy is uncertain. Gorbachev's aide Anatoly Chernyayev, who sat in on Politburo meetings, recalled that "Shevardnadze more than once reminded the Politburo that certain things might evoke irritation on the part of North Korea." According to his account, however, Shevardnadze did not throw the full weight of his influence against the rapid improvement of relations with the South in 1990 but instead told Gorbachev, "You do whatever you want but without me."

Following Gorbachev's meeting with Roh in San Francisco, the decision had been made in Moscow to establish full diplomatic relations with South Korea as of January 1, 1991. In discussing how to tell Pyongyang, it was suggested that Shevardnadze send his Asia chief, Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev, as a special envoy to do the distasteful job. However, Shevardnadze, a man of courage and honor, felt obligated to go himself, knowing

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