The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [223]
In his remarks Kim acknowledged to some extent the difficulties facing the country, saying that "the most urgent issue to be solved at present is the grain problem.... the food problem is creating a state of anarchy." Despite the onslaught of "heart-aching occurrences," Kim was highly critical of the street-corner food sellers and peddlers who had spontaneously emerged in response to urgent needs. "This creates egotism among the people, and the base of the party's class may come to collapse. Then, the party will lose popular support and dissolve. This has been well-illustrated by past incidents in Poland and Czechoslovakia."
Kim absolved himself of responsibility for the country's economic problems, maintaining that his father, who had spent much of his time in economic guidance, "repeatedly told me that if I got involved in economic work, I would not be able to handle party and army work properly." He implied that his job was too important to deal with mere economic issues: "If I handle even practical economic work, it will have irreparable consequences on the revolution and construction.... The people now unconditionally accept the directives of the Party Central Committee because of my authority, not because party organizations and functionaries carry out their work well.... No functionary assists me effectively. I am working alone."
The only institution to win unstinting praise from Kim Jong Il was the army, on which he had become increasingly reliant. Of fortyseven of his activities during 1996 made public in North Korea, thirty were visits to military units or other military-related activities. In contrast to the laggard youth he had observed at Kim Il Sung University, he declared, "all soldiers are politically and ideologically sound and their revolutionary military spirit is lofty." He was satisfied that the soldiers would "protect with their lives the nerve center of the revolu- tion"-himself and other high-level leaders.
Kim's speech confirmed that, as suspected by American and South Korean intelligence, food shortages were affecting even the army. He proclaimed that the people must be told, "If you do not send rice to the army, even if the wretched Americans attack us, we cannot win. Then you will also become slaves, and your sons and daughters and grandsons and granddaughters will too."
In January 1997, despite the catastrophic state of the economy, Kim as commander-in-chief ordered a return to the full-scale conduct of the winter training exercises, which had been severely truncated the previous year. At great expense in fuel, ammunition, and other resources, a large proportion of North Korea's huge army moved along the roadways and trails to new positions, fired weapons, and practiced for combat operations. In March, Kim also ordered highly unusual "total mobilization" exercises in which cars in Pyongyang were covered with camouflage netting and thousands of people took refuge in underground shelters, as they would do in case of war. On April 25, the anniversary of the founding of the army, tens of thousands of troops paraded in mass formations in Pyongyang to mark the occasion.
At his headquarters in Seoul, General Tilelli watched the vigorous military activity in the North with deep concern. He was "intuitively" certain, he told me, that the DPRK military forces had been degraded by shortages and the general deterioration affecting the country. On the other hand, U.S. and South Korean forces had been continuously modernized and improved. While this had affected the military balance on the peninsula to the detriment of the North, he said, it was impossible to say by how much. The DPRK military continued to be highly capable, making up in mass what it lacked in modernization, the American commander said, and it "might be