The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [224]
What worried him and his staff was the possibility that the North Korean leadership could become so desperate that the combined power of the U.S. and South Korean forces might no longer deter a massive attack. Tilelli was certain that "the explosion," as such an attack was known among his military planners, would fail after a period of bloody and destructive fighting, which would wreak death and destruction in the South but would also destroy much that North Korea had built in its half-century of existence. Given the lack of what Pyongyang's leadership considers other options, said a member of Tilelli's staff, "I don't think a decision to attack would be irrational-though it might turn out to be wrong."
Beginning in 1997, the supply of food to alleviate the devastating situation at home became increasingly the central focus of North Korean diplomacy and of international concern, eclipsing other issues. This placed the United States and South Korea, and much of the world at large, in a terrible dilemma. North Korea was continuing to feed and supply a huge and menacing army even while many of its people were hungry or even starving. The regime's statist and short-sighted policies, as much or more than the floods, were to blame for its current crisis, but it refused to undertake major changes in economic policy. Few nations wished to aid such a regime. Yet a growing number of reports placed North Korea on the brink of a great humanitarian disaster, making it intolerable to do nothing to help. Moreover, for strategic reasons and considerations of international stability, most of North Korea's neighbors and the U.S. government as well, wished to stave off the sudden downfall of that regime, fearing it might bring devastating violence that could affect all of Northeast Asia.
The United States was willing to provide funds to purchase food on a humanitarian basis, and proceeded to do so in response to U.N. appeals. However, Washington rejected attempts by North Korean diplomats to link their attendance at peace talks and agreement to various tension-reducing steps to the supply of food assistance. Washington also ruled out supplying the massive amounts of aid that would be re quired to end the famine. The U.S. problem was essentially political: Congress would not support "aiding" North Korea, but would permit modest contributions to U.N. humanitarian efforts intended to feed its people.
South Korea was less hesitant about linking food to its diplomatic and political objectives. Early in 1997, ROK officials sought to use food as a bargaining chip, supplying or permitting private groups to supply only limited amounts in order to maximize diplomatic leverage over North Korea. As reports of starvation multiplied, however, public pain over the suffering of fellow Koreans brought a shift in government policy. Beginning in the spring, Seoul provided 50,000 tons of food through the Red Cross. In 1998, with a new administration in office, the ROK relaxed most restrictions on the non-governmental supply of food and other aid. In a spectacular consequence of the new policy, Hyundai group founder Chung Ju Yung, who was born in the North, brought 500 head of cattle through the DMZ in June and 501 in October 1998 for starving North Koreans. His private diplomacy led to unprecedented visits by South Korean tourists to the North, and promises of much bigger North-South economic deals to come.
After initial generosity Japan, whose warehouses were bursting with surplus grain, was held back by requests for restraint from Seoul and then by new revelations that several Japanese citizens, including a 13-year-old girl, had been kidnapped by North Korean agents in the 1970s and never returned. North Korea refused to accept responsibility for the kidnappings, and Japan refused to supply more food.
China, which announced modest contributions of grain to North Korea, was believed to be supplying much greater amounts at cut-rate prices and through private barter deals. Customs data